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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences 
bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS 
simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive 
total effect on bank risk. This is the result of a positive direct effect, which reflects 
monitoring and opportunistic behavior, and a negative indirect effect, which works 
through the design of managerial incentive contracts and reflects shareholder 
preferences toward risk. Large shareholders reduce bank risk by reducing the sensitivity 
of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Vega) and by increasing the CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity (Delta). In addition, we show that the direct and indirect effect of ownership 
concentration on bank risk depends on the type of the largest shareholder (a family, a 
bank, a corporation or an institutional investor), as well as, on the total shareholding 
held by each type as a group. Our results suggest that the positive relation between 
ownership concentration and risk is not the result of preferences towards more risk. 
Rather, they point at opportunistic behavior of large shareholders. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent crisis has raised a number of questions about the adequacy of corporate 
governance systems and managerial incentives practices in financial institutions. Research 
attention has been focused in particular on the relationship between executives incentives and 
bank risk (DeYoung et al. 2012; Armstrong and Vahishtha, 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 
2011). Limited attention has been given, however, to the importance of considering ownership 
structure to study the effect of executive incentives on bank risk, although theory and evidence 
suggest that CEO compensation represent the shareholders preferences toward risk (Mehran, 
Morrison and Sahpiro, 2011). In fact, the say- on- pay votes approved under the Dodd-Frank 
Act provisions aims to align manager’s interest with those of shareholders. However, there is 
limited evidence on how risk preferences vary among different types of shareholders and on 
how the ownership structure influences executive incentive contracts to affect bank risk. In this 
study we provide such evidence.  
This paper examines the risk preferences of large shareholders and the mechanisms 
underlying the relationship between ownership concentration and bank risk for a large sample 
of US banks over the period 1997-2007. In particular, we decompose the total effect of 
ownership concentration on bank risk into a direct effect, which reflects monitoring or 
opportunistic behavior, and an indirect effect, which works through the design of managerial 
incentive contracts and reflects large shareholders’ risk preferences. In terms of incentives, we 
focus on the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega), and on the sensitivity of 
CEO wealth to stock price (Delta). To this extent, we combine the literature on bank 
ownership structures and risk-taking, with the literature on the risk- taking effect of executive 
compensation, to better assess the determinants of bank risk. 
Previous literature has focused on the direct effect of ownership concentration on bank 
risk, without considering different types of ownership or examining the underlying mechanisms 
of this relationship (e.g., Saunders et al., 1990; Demsetz et al., 1997; Burkhart et al., 1997; 
Iannota et al., 2007). In particular, this literature has build on agency theory and, generally, 
treats shareholders as a uniform group with the important assumption that shareholders are 
risk neutral and that they all prefer more risk to less, as in any limited liability firm. In contrast, 
managers with bank-specific human capital skills and private benefits of control are expected to 
advocate for less risk-taking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Under this 
framework, differences in risk among banks stem from differences in the ability of shareholders 
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to manage the risk-related incentive problem (defined as risk-adverse managers passing up 
positive but risky net present value (NPV) projects that shareholders would like to undertake). 
This problem is expected to be lower in firms with concentrated ownership, as controlling 
shareholders have the ability to discipline managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Franks et al, 
2001). However, the empirical evidence on the effect of ownership concentration on bank risk 
is mixed, which suggests it may be important to consider differences in ownership types, in 
addition to concentration. In this sense, Iannota et al. (2007) report a negative effect and 
conclude that their result deserves further research, as they cannot be explained within an 
agency framework. 
This paper builds on this stream of literature and contributes to it by considering a) 
differences in risk preferences between different types of shareholders (i.e., families, 
corporations, banks, and institutional investors), since theoretical and empirical research 
suggests that agency problems depend on the firm’s ownership structure (La Porta et al. 1999, 
Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009), and b) the mechanisms through which shareholders influence 
bank risk.  
Building on agency theory, we argue that the risk taking behavior of banks is the result of 
two main agency problems. In line with previous research, the first agency problem that affects 
bank risk is the owner/ manager agency problem (type I agency problem), which may lead to 
managers not acting in the best interest of the shareholders, in terms of risk taking. 
Shareholders, especially controlling owners, can reduce this agency problem by increasing their 
monitoring effort and by altering managerial compensation1. Therefore, as large shareholders 
have the means to influence the design of executive incentive contracts toward their risk 
preferences, we use such a design to extracts their risk preferences. While traditional agency 
theory predicts that large shareholders would always prefer more risk to less, we posit that this 
may not be the case, if we take into account how much of a major stockholder's wealth is 
concentrated in the bank. These wealth concentration effects could make a shareholder more 
risk averse than otherwise would be expected (Sullivan and Spong, 2007; Faccio, Marchica and 
Mura, 2011).  
                                                 
1 Both elements are likely to act as complements in the banking industry since the relationship between CEO 
effort and outcomes such as bank performance or risk-taking are highly uncertain, due to the influence of 
numerous organizational and environmental contingencies that are outside CEO control (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).    
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The second agency problem affecting bank risk, that has received less attention, arises from 
conflicts between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (type II agency problem). 
Controlling shareholders may seek private benefits at the expense of non-controlling 
shareholders which may lead to higher bank risk (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). To illustrate, 
controlling shareholders can seek private benefits through tunneling behavior, incompetent 
management, placement of relatives in executive positions, inadequate investments, or 
resistance to value-increasing takeovers (Johnson et al., 2000). These problems may become 
more severe at banks with concentrated ownership structure, because of large shareholders’ 
control over the banks’ board of directors (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
Considering these two types of agency problems and the possibility of a lack of 
diversification on the part of a large shareholder, we base our analysis on the following 
assumptions: first, we assume that shareholders aim to maximize their utility which may vary 
substantially between shareholders, depending on their ownership stake as well as their 
portfolio diversification. Second, we assume, in line with previous literature, that large 
shareholders try to maximize their utility directly, via monitoring or opportunistic behavior, and 
indirectly via the design of managerial incentive contracts. Thus, we decompose the total effect 
of ownership concentration on bank risk into a direct and into an indirect effect. Figure 1 
illustrates our model. 
----------- Insert Figure 1 about here ----------- 
 Ex ante, it is unclear whether concentrated banks are riskier or less risky than banks with a 
dispersed ownership structure. While large (un)diversified owners may employ monitoring and 
managerial incentives to motivate managers to take more (less) risk, opportunistic behavior is 
expected to be positively related to bank risk. Therefore, the relationship between ownership 
concentration and bank risk is expected to be positive for large diversified owners. For large 
undiversified owners, however, the sign of this relationship will depend on whether the risk 
increase due to opportunistic behavior is larger or smaller than the risk reduction through 
monitoring and managerial incentives.  
We examine this issue empirically by using simultaneous equation models that account for 
the endogenous nature of the relationship between management incentives and bank risk 
profile. While most, if not all, of the simultaneous equations studies in the area of ownership 
structure, compensation, and risk analyze the direct effect of the independent variable on the 
5 
 
dependent variable in each equation from the structural forms coefficients, these coefficients 
ignore the indirect effects these independent variables have on dependent variables in other 
equations. In this study we consider these indirect effects, i.e., we take into account that when 
risk changes in response to an initial change in the ownership structure variable, the managerial 
incentives variables also respond to this change in risk as well as to the initial change in 
ownership structure, thus causing a further change in risk.  
Our results show that the ownership structure influences both bank risk and CEO 
incentive contracts and that CEO incentives influence bank risk. Thus, our findings suggest 
that CEO compensation is an important mechanism for shareholders to induce their preferred 
risk-level. In particular, we find that ownership concentration has a total positive effect on bank 
risk and that this effect can be decomposed into a positive direct effect, and a negative indirect 
effect. While the positive direct effect is the result of large shareholders opportunistic behavior, 
the indirect effect works through managerial incentives contracts. Large shareholders reduce 
bank risk by offering low-Vega and high-Delta executive incentive contracts. 
We find that the strength of the positive direct and negative indirect effect depend on the 
type of the largest shareholder. The positive direct and negative indirect effect is strongest when 
the largest shareholder is a family and weakest when it concerns a bank or corporation. Finally, 
we look at the effect of total shareholdings by type on bank risk. We find that institutional 
shareholdings have a positive direct and indirect effect on bank risk, while family shareholdings 
show a positive direct effect and a negative indirect effect, which results in a positive total effect. 
Corporate and bank ownership are very small compared to institutional and family ownership 
when it concerns a non-controlling stake and, as a result, they do not have a significant direct 
effect on bank risk although they have an indirect effect via the design of CEO incentives.  
Our results on the effect of managerial incentives on bank risk show that Vega has a 
positive direct effect on bank risk, while the direct effect of Delta on bank risk is negative. In 
addition, we consider the simultaneous relation between Vega and Delta, and we look at the 
indirect effect of Vega (Delta) on bank risk via Delta (Vega). We show that an increase in Vega 
(Delta) has a negative (positive) indirect effect on risk via Delta (Vega). Overall, the positive 
(negative) direct effect of Vega (Delta) on risk is higher (lower) than the negative (positive) 
indirect effect of Vega (Delta) on risk via Delta (Vega), which leads to an overall positive 
relationship between Vega (Delta) and Risk. 
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Our findings hold for different measures of risk and different measures of ownership 
structure, and they suggest that that the positive relation between ownership concentration and 
risk, documented in previous studies, is not the result of higher preferences toward risk. Rather, 
our results suggest that it may be the result of the opportunistic behavior of large shareholders. 
Therefore, government intervention to limit risk-taking incentives in financial executive 
compensation contracts may be insufficient for banks controlled by undiversified shareholders 
with preferences toward lower risk. Rather, regulation of these types of bank may focus on 
reducing the type II agency problems.  
Our empirical analysis extends the existing literature in four main directions. First, our 
evidence provides an important step toward a better understanding of the impact of equity 
ownership and managerial incentives on bank risk. Prior research, generally, focuses on the 
direct effect of ownership concentration on the level of bank risk, without considering different 
types of owners2, or examining the underlying mechanisms of this relationship. In contrast, we 
investigate the preferences of different types of large shareholders toward risk and we 
decompose the total effect of ownership concentration on bank risk into a direct and an 
indirect effect. Accordingly, we apply standard modeling and econometric approaches, 
including simultaneous equations, suitable control variables, and firm fixed effects, so as to 
isolate how ownership influence bank risk through the design of managerial incentives 
contracts. 
Second, as far as we know, this is one of the first studies to analyze the role of managerial 
incentives as an underlying mechanism through which shareholders may attain their desired 
level of risk. While the underlying assumption of most previous studies is that the relationship 
between risk-taking and ownership is associated with monitoring, we make an attempt to open 
the “black box” of governance processes and practices that shareholders use to deal with the 
risk-related incentive problem.  
Third, we contribute to the literature on the link between managerial incentives and 
financial stability (DeYoung et al. 2012; Mehran and Rosenberg, 2007; Chen et al. 2006) by 
providing evidence of the relationship between equity incentives and risk. We add to this 
literature by examining the indirect effect of a change in Vega (Delta) on risk via Delta (Vega). 
                                                 
2 A great number of studies show that large US corporations tend to be widely dispersed and even if they have large 
blockholders they are much less common than in other countries (Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
However, Holderness (2009) questions the dispersion of ownership structure in the US, given that 96% of the 
firms in his sample have blockholders. 
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The analysis of these indirect effects is important as it helps to understand the total effect of 
incentives on risk. The analysis of the direct effect can misstate the magnitude of the total effect 
and can even misstate the direction of the effect.  
Forth, our analysis covers a broad sample of US bank-holding companies over the period 
1997-2007, and extends the research into an important segment of the banking industry that 
has not received much attention previously, in part due to data unavailability. Thus, our sample 
has a larger variation in ownership structure, managerial incentives and risk. This leads to 
potentially more powerful tests, and more importantly, it allow us to generalize our inference to 
a broader segment of the economy. Furthermore, by estimating Delta and Vega for the 
manager’s entire portfolio of stock and options, we obtain a more precise measure of the 
incentives faced by managers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on 
ownership structure, executive compensation and risk taking, and formulates our hypotheses. 
Section 3 presents the sample, while section 4 describes the empirical model. Section 5 defines 
our variables of interest. Section 6 and 7 present the results and the robustness tests. Finally, 
Section 8 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
In what follows, we provide a detail explanation of each of the mechanisms through which 
large shareholders can affect bank risk and we build our hypotheses on the effect of ownership 
concentration on bank risk. Then, we develop our hypothesis on the effect of management 
incentive contracts on bank risk. Finally, we extend our analysis to different types of controlling 
shareholders. 
2.1 Mechanisms underlying the relationship between ownership structure and bank risk 
2.1.1 Monitoring and incentives contracts: mechanisms to induce large shareholder preferences toward risk.  
Large shareholders may induce their preferred risk behavior on their managers, directly 
through monitoring and indirectly via the design of executive incentive contracts. An important 
factor influencing large shareholders preferences toward risk is how much of a major 
shareholder’s wealth is concentrated in the bank. On the one hand, diversified large owners 
would like managers to undertake all positive net present value (NPV) projects regardless of 
their risk. On the other hand, owners with a large fraction of their personal wealth invested in 
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the bank are less risk tolerant, since they are subject to both systematic and unsystematic risk. 
Underdiversification may lead shareholders to pass up some profitable projects on the basis of 
total risk and lead to a preference for less risky positive NPV projects (Smith and Stulz, 1985; 
Sullivan and Spong, 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Extended liability could be a further motivation of large shareholders to moderate bank 
risk. If a bank becomes closer to default, a capital increase might be unavoidable for regulatory 
reasons. In this scenario, the controlling shareholder would be pressured by the regulator and 
market participants to restore the minimum level of capital. The higher the fraction of the 
dominant shareholder’s stake, the higher the likelihood of his intervention. The unwillingness 
or inability of the controlling shareholder to inject new capital will likely lead to regulatory 
actions to prevent the bank’s default, which would result in a reduction of the controlling 
shareholder’s power and possibly in the loss of control. Although these measures also apply to a 
bank with dispersed ownership, their impact on atomistic shareholders is negligible as 
regulators can exert less pressure on them. Therefore, while the liability of a bank’s controlling 
shareholder is de jure limited to the amount of his original capital contribution (as for any other 
shareholders), it might be de facto extended, because of prudential regulation. As a result, an 
increase in ownership concentration may discourage risk taking (Iannota et al., 2011). 
Thus, if an increase in the ownership stake of large shareholders reduces the degree of 
diversification and produces effects similar to that of an extended liability regime, an increase in 
ownership concentration may discourage risk taking. In such a case, we may expect large 
shareholders to provide low-risk sensitive incentives contract to their managers and to monitor 
management toward the reduction of risk. The reverse would be true if large shareholders are 
well diversified, i.e., they could provide high-risk sensitive managerial incentives and monitor 
management to induce more risk taking. 
2.1.2 Large shareholders opportunistic behavior and bank risk.  
Large shareholders may have a direct positive effect on bank risk via their opportunistic 
behavior as they may choose risky economic actions to maximize their personal utility at the 
expense of other shareholders (type II agency problems). For instance, controlling shareholders 
can seek such private benefits by diverting funds for their own personal benefits in the form of 
special (hidden) dividends and preferential deals with their other (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), 
through managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) or by foregoing some risk 
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diversification gains (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985)3. Many of these activities increase the 
probability of costly lower-tail outcomes4, In this sense, La Porta et al. (2003) show that, in 
many countries, banks lend to firms controlled by the bank’s owner and that these related loans 
are more likely to default and when they do, they have lower recovery rates.  
2.1.3 The direct, indirect and total effect of ownership concentration on bank risk 
Considering the mechanisms described previously, we decompose the total effect of 
ownership concentration on bank risk into a direct and indirect effect. The direct effect of large 
shareholders on bank risk is given by their monitoring effort and opportunistic behavior while 
the indirect effect works through the design of managerial incentive contracts.  
Whereas the potential opportunistic behavior of large shareholders may always lead to 
higher bank risk, the monitoring effort and the design of incentive contracts could aim to 
induce higher or lower level of risk, depending on the risk preferences of the large shareholders. 
Thus, the direct effect will be positive if large shareholders are well diversified, as both 
monitoring and opportunistic behavior will lead to higher bank risk. In this situation the total 
effect of ownership concentration on bank risk will be positive, as the indirect effect will also 
lead to higher bank risk. However, the sign of the direct and total effect is not clear when large 
shareholders are underdiversified. In such a case, the indirect effect is expected to be negative 
but the sign of the direct effect will depend on whether the opportunistic behavior effect 
dominates the monitoring effect. Thus, the sign of the total effect will depend on the sign and 
on the magnitude of the direct effect compared to the indirect effect.  
We argue that when large shareholders suffer from underdiversification and from an 
extended liability effect, large shareholders’ and managers’ interests toward risk are likely to be 
more closely aligned. Both perceive high costs associated with financial distress, leading to lower 
type I agency problems. In such cases, we expect that the risk introduced by the type II agency 
                                                 
3 Agency problems related to concentrated ownership include incompetent management, placement of relatives in 
executive positions, excessive or insufficient investment, resistance to value-increasing takeovers or the exhibition 
of a tunneling behavior. Different forms of tunneling include the transfer of resources from the firm through self-
dealing transactions, asset sales and contracts to the controlling shareholder, excessive executive compensation, 
loan guarantees, expropriation of corporate opportunities, and so on, as well as minority freeze-outs, insider 
trading, creeping acquisitions, or other financial transactions that discriminate against minorities (Johnson et al., 
2000) 
4 See, for example, Gilson and Villalonga (2009), for a recent case on Adelphia Communications Corporation’s 
bankruptcy, the eleventh largest bankruptcy case in history. The case highlights the potential expropriation of 
other investors by large, controlling shareholders such as founding families, who retain their controls through the 
dual-class share structure.   
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problems to be higher than the reduction of risk achieved through executive incentives and 
monitoring (as potential type I agency problems are already lower). Thus, in line with previous 
arguments, we hypothesize, to the extent that large shareholders suffer from under 
diversification and from an extended liability effect, that: 
H1a:  Ownership concentration has an indirect negative effect on bank risk, through executive incentives. 
H1b:  Ownership concentration has a direct positive effect on bank risk. 
H1c:  Ownership concentration has a total positive effect on bank risk.  
2.2 Executive compensation and bank risk 
One assumption in our analysis is that large shareholders induce their preferred level of 
risk through the design of CEO’s incentives contracts, which implies that incentive contracts 
influence bank risk. While previous literature provides some support to the incentives-bank risk 
relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006), we 
provide additional evidence on this relationship. 
Two important measures of those incentives are Vega and Delta (Core and Guay, 2002). 
Vega captures the change in the dollar value of CEO wealth for a 0.01 change in stock return 
volatility. Including a large amount of stock option grants in CEO compensation packages, 
typically, will result in high Vega. Delta measures the change in the dollar value of CEO wealth 
for a 1% change in stock price. Including a large amount of stock grants (and to a lesser extent, 
stock option grants) in CEO compensation packages, typically, will result in high Delta. 
The impact of high Delta on bank risk is two-fold. On the one hand, high-Delta contracts 
tie managerial wealth to shareholder value, and reduce the conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders. John and John (1993) suggest that higher delta increases the 
incentive to shift risk to debtholders. In addition, if higher NPV projects tend to be relatively 
risky, increased delta could provide the incentive to implement higher risk projects. (risk-
increasing effect). On the other hand, high-Delta contracts concentrate managerial wealth to the 
firm, exposing managers to more risk. To the extent that managers are undiversified with 
respect to firm-specific wealth, an increase in the risk faced by managers also reduces their 
utility. Accordingly, managers with a high-Delta contract may maximize their utility by 
foregoing some positive net-present-value projects that would increase firm risk (risk-aversion 
effect) (Guay, 1999). Ceteris paribus, the risk-aversion effect is expected to dominate the risk 
increasing effect (Knopf et al., 2002). 
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The impact of Vega on manager incentives is clearer. Because it rewards stock return 
volatility, high-Vega compensation makes risk more valuable to managers and mitigates 
potential managerial risk aversion (Smith and Stulz 1985; Guay 1999). High-Vega contracts seek 
to alleviate the risk aversion effect of high-Delta contract problem by increasing their pay-risk 
sensitivity. Then, option-based compensation, by providing convex payoffs, can potentially 
reduce CEO preferences for low-risk decisions that may arise from a high-Delta. Thus, we 
expect a positive relationship between Delta and Vega, and we also analyze the indirect effect of 
Vega (Delta) on risk via Delta (Vega). 
Several recent studies on banking provide evidence that high-Vega compensation 
encourages riskier policy choices, while high-Delta compensation encourages less risky policy 
choices (e.g. Beltratti and Stulz, 2009; Cheng et al., 2010; DeYoung et al., 2012; Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz, 2011). In line with this prior literature and to the extent that stock price sensitivity 
gives a risk-averse manager an incentive to avoid risk, we hypothesize that: 
H2a: Vega has a positive direct effect on bank risk. 
H2b: Delta has a negative direct effect on bank risk. 
In our research design we take into account that Delta and Vega are simultaneously 
determined and that their design may not be exogenous; in response to managers’ policy 
choices, and the risk profiles implied by those choices, boards may take action to alter 
managerial incentives, either to complement or to influence the amount of risk managers take 
in the implementation of those policies (Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006; Crawford et al., 1995; 
Hubbard and Palia 1995).  
2.3 Ownership type 
Several researchers, including Barca and Becht (2001) and Aguilera and Jackson (2003), 
call for a distinction between types of controlling shareholders when studying the ownership 
structure. Rather than assuming that all types of owners are associated with the exact same 
agency problems, it is crucial to understand how type I and Type II agency problems vary 
between different types of shareholders. Following Barca and Becht (2001) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), we distinguish between families, corporations, banks, and institutional investors 
when they are the largest shareholder to analyze the relationship between ownership 
concentration and bank risk. Family owners are expected to show the highest risk aversion, the 
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lowest type I agency problems and the highest type II agency problems followings by 
corporations, banks and institutional investors.  
In terms of risk preferences and type I agency problems, family and large corporate owners 
may prefer, and have the ability5, to set low risk-sensitive incentive contracts to their managers 
as they rarely hold diversified portfolios6, which reduces their preferences toward risk. However, 
there is no clear theoretical prediction of the risk preferences of bank and institutional owners 
as it may depend on their degree of diversification. On the one hand, banks may encourage7 
conservative risk-taking strategies at the individual bank level for both safety-net and extended 
liability reasons, especially if they hold a disproportionate stake in the bank. On the other 
hand, banks tend to have diversified investment portfolios which increase their preference for 
risk when controlling another bank (Barry et al., 2011). Similarly, institutional investors, such 
as mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, and other non-banking organizations, tend to 
have, on average, well-diversified investment portfolios. However, when they appear as the 
largest shareholder, they may have a disproportionate stake invested in the bank and may be 
concerned about extended liability, which could reduce their risk appetite. 
To illustrate this point, we briefly describe the case of Well Fargo, one of the largest banks 
in our sample with a market capitalization of $120 billion in 2007. The total stake of 
institutional investors in Wells Fargo in 2007 was about 70 percent, distributed over 525 
different investors. Bershire Hathaway was the largest shareholders with a stake of 9.24 percent, 
which represented more than 12 percent of its investment portfolio. In this setting, Bershire 
Hathaway has a significant part of its wealth tied to the bank, which would lead to a lower risk 
preference.  
In terms of type II agency problems, we expect that the incentives of large shareholders to 
use their controlling positions in banks to expropriate to vary across different types of owners. 
As Villalonga and Amit (2006) point out, if the large shareholder is an institution or a bank, 
the private benefits of control are diluted among many independent owners. As a result, the 
                                                 
5 Families and corporate owners often hold senior management positions and are long-term investors, which places 
them in a unique position to influence and monitor the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) 
6 Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that families who appear in both Forbes’ Wealthiest Americans Survey and the 
S&P 500 have over 69% of their wealth invested in their firms 
7 When a bank controls another bank, its insider knowledge of the business, together with a large shareholder 
position, provides the bank with a strong influence over the strategic choices and governance mechanisms to align 
management.  
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tunneling incentives might be weaker for these types of controlling shareholders than for 
controlling families and corporations8.  
For all shareholder types and to the extent that banks and institutional investors suffer 
from underdiversification and from an extended liability effect, we expect the risk introduced 
by the type II agency problem to be larger than the reduction of risk induced through 
monitoring. Thus, we anticipate a positive direct effect of concentration on banks risk. In terms 
of the indirect effect, we anticipate a negative effect, weaker than the positive direct effect, 
leading to a total positive effect. Thus, in line with the previous arguments we hypothesize that: 
H3a: The type of the largest owner influences the direct positive relationship between concentration and 
risk, as well as the indirect negative relationship through compensation. The positive direct and negative 
indirect effects are expected to be strongest for family owners and weakest for institutional investors.  
We also distinguish between the total shareholdings held by each type of shareholders as a 
group. A main difference between looking at the total shareholdings by type compared to the 
largest shareholder is that it alters the average degree of diversification and introduces free-
riding problems. These differences are fundamentally important for institutional investors.  
While controlling institutional investors may face under-diversification or extended liability 
problems, these problems do not affect the average institutional investor which may have a 
strong preference for risk9. Given these preferences and the ability of institutional investors to 
influence governance choices, we would expect banks with a large proportion of institutional 
investors to be associated with more risk. In this sense, Barry et al. (2011) argue that 
institutional investors can shape the nature of corporate risk taking. Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance 
                                                 
8 Previous studies have shown that family-dominated banks may suffer from capital restrictions, executive 
entrenchment, lack of managerial expertise, and nepotism, which may reduce performance and increase the bank’s 
risk level (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). Davidsson (1989) finds that owner-managers deter 
growth when growth is expected to result in a loss of control. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) argue that opportunities 
for diversification are especially limited in family-owned firms, in part because a decreasing size of the organization 
reduces the number of possible strategies to choose from. Furthermore, family ownership tends to shield firms 
from the disciplinary pressures of the market for corporate control (Stulz, 1988), providing family executives with 
greater freedom to pursue their own agenda. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) suggest that entrenched family CEOs may 
take actions that make family-controlled banks riskier, due to incompetence or the pursuit of non-economically 
motivated preferences. Finally, Laeven (1999) shows that family banks are likely to suffer from connected lending. 
9 Over time, institutional ownership has largely supplanted individual and family ownership and accounts for the 
majority of all US listed equity (Daily et al. 2003, Healy and Palepu 2003). While in the 1950s, institutional 
investors held 6.4 percent of US equities, by 2009, institutional investors held 50.6% percent of U.S. equities, and 
73 percent of the equity of the 1000 largest US corporations (Gilson and Gordon, 2011). In contrast, individual 
investors held 38 percent of US equity in 2009. Institutional shareholders manage enormous amounts of wealth 
and tend to hold diversified portfolios (the largest institutional investor, BlackRock, manages over $3500 billion). 
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sensitivity of executive compensation; and Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman (2010) argue that 
institutional investors are more sophisticated and provide a monitoring service. Regarding the 
type II agency problems, institutional investors as a group are less likely to expropriate other 
investors because of coordination problems and their dispersed ownership structure. 
To the extent that individual/family shareholders without a controlling stake hold a 
diversified portfolio, they would also prefer more risk. However, as a consequence of 
coordination problems between individuals, they are, most often, without voice as a group, 
lacking the ability to monitor and influence executive compensation. Therefore, we believe 
individual/family shareholders, as a group, to have limited influence on bank risk and executive 
compensation, unless it concerns a family-dominated bank. In such a case, we may expect a 
positive direct effect and a negative effect of family shareholdings on bank risk. 
 Finally, corporate and bank ownership is relatively small compared to institutional and 
individual/family ownership when it concerns a non-controlling stake. We, therefore, expect 
the influence of corporate and bank ownership, as a group, on risk and compensation to be 
small.  
Following the arguments with respect to the influence of different types of shareholders as 
a group on bank risk and executive compensation, we hypothesize that:  
H3b: Institutional shareholdings have a positive direct and indirect effect on bank risk, while 
Individual/Family, Corporate and Bank shareholdings have no significant effect. 
3. Sample Description  
Our data covers the period 1997-2007 and is constructed by merging information on four 
different data sources as follows. First, we extract compensation data from the SNL Financial 
database. This database tabulates in detail the compensation of top executives for a large sample 
of banks. Previous studies, based on Execucomp, Compustat, CRSP, and Forbes Survey data, 
include few medium-sized and smaller banks. Hence, this study extends the research into an 
important segment of the banking industry that has not received much attention previously, in 
part due to data unavailability. An additional advantage of SNL data is that the number of 
options granted in each year is provided with the exact exercise terms, which allows a better 
estimation of Delta and Vega. We collect CEO compensation data for all U.S. listed bank 
holding companies that appear on the SNL financial database, for the period January 1997 - 
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December 2007. Our sample is therefore not contaminated by the exceptional events of the 
recent financial crisis. Our initial sample consists of 606 different banks and 5,316 bank-year 
observations. 
We impose certain restrictions on the selection of the sample. To be included in the 
sample, a bank must report CEO compensation for at least three consecutive years. Next, we 
collect the following CEO information for each bank in each of years: (1) annual base salary, (2) 
annual cash bonus, (3) annual long-term compensation (non-option awards based on multi-year 
performance goals, incentive plan award, etc.), (4) non-equity incentives plan compensation 
(amount earned pursuant to non equity incentives plans) (5) value of new option and stock 
grants during the year, estimated by SNL using an approximation of the Black–Scholes model. 
Finally, we collect the total number of both exercisable and non-exercisable stock options along 
with the exercise price and option expiration date at fiscal year end from the table on 
Outstanding Equity Awards at fiscal-year end to calculate the option’s Black-Scholes value as 
well as its sensitivity to volatility and stock price changes. 
Daily stock price and Treasury bond yield data is derived from Bloomberg Thomson 
Financial to calculate our risk measures. This data also serves for some of the inputs to estimate 
Delta and Vega. Similar to Anderson and Fraser (2000), we exclude year-observations when the 
banks’ equity has less than 50 trading days. This reduces our sample to 586 banks and 3,256 
bank-year observations. 
We, further, restrict the sample to observations with available data on the ownership 
composition, extracted from the Thomson One Banker Ownership database. We construct a 
panel of all shareholdings by each shareholder of each bank over our sample period and analyze 
and correct any significant deviations, using the annual reports and international business 
media. In addition, we identify family ties between shareholders to determine the total equity 
stake of each family, using the banks’ web sites and international business media.  
Finally to construct our control variables, we collect the state-level Coincident Index of 
economic conditions for each state from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s database.; 
the number of deposits for each bank in each state from the FDIC's database and CEO’s and 
balance sheet information from SNL Financial database. Our final sample contains 446 banks 
and 2,554 bank-year observations. Table 1 provides the sample selection details. 
----------- Insert Table 1 about here ----------- 
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4. Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate a series of equations in which we model the level of 
bank risk and managerial incentives as a function of the bank’s ownership structure. In our 
research design, we account for endogenous nature of managerial incentives (Vega and Delta) 
and bank risk using 2SLS simultaneous equation modeling (as in Coles et al., 2006 and 
DeYoung et al., 2012). Particularly we adapt De Young (2012) model to our purpose and we 
specify the following system of simultaneous equations: 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8
ln ln ln lnt t t t t t t
t t
Risk Vega Delta OS Assets Equityratio TobinQ
EconCond MarketConcentration
β β β β β β
β β
= + + + + + +
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θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
= + + + + + +
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, where t indexes time and the cross-sectional index for individual banks is suppressed for 
convenience. Risk is specified in alternative versions of the model as Total Risk, Insolvency Risk, 
Systematic Risk, or Idiosyncratic Risk. Os, refers to the bank’s ownership structure which is 
specified in alternative versions of the model as ownership concentration or ownership type. 
We describe the procedures used to construct these measures in the next section. 
We estimate each of the equations in our model using standard two-stage least squares 
techniques with instrumental variables, fixed effects and clustered standard errors by banks 
since it is well-known that ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation will not provide consistent 
estimates of the coefficients in the structural equations. In the absence of misspecification, the 
resulting coefficient estimates by 2SLS are consistent, but not necessarily as efficient as full 
information estimates by 3SLS. However, there are three basic advantages associated with 
limited information 2SLS procedures relative to full information procedures that motivate its 
use. First, 2SLS estimations allow us to take advantage of the panel data structure of our data 
and it may be preferred to full information estimation techniques in smaller samples. Second, 
the estimation results may be less affected by misspecification in the system, which will be very 
likely in the early stages of a research inquiry. For example, if the risk equation is misspecified, 
but the compensation contract equations are correctly specified, the specification error will only 
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affect the risk equation when the system is estimated via 2SLS. However, the misspecification 
will affect all equations when the system is estimated via full information estimation 
techniques. Challen and Hagger (1983) perform Monte Carlo simulations and indicate that 
2SLS is more robust to multicollinearity and specification problems than full information 
estimation techniques10.  
To verify that the two-step estimator is warranted, we perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
This test rejects the exogeneity of equity incentives in the risk equation and of risk and Delta 
(Vega) in the Vega (Delta) equation, confirming the choice of a two-stage estimator. 
In setting the time structure of our model, we follow Coles et al (2006) and use 
contemporaneous values of our endogenous variables to conform to the underlying reasoning 
of simultaneous equation. Thus, we assume that the incentives established in year t generate 
risk taking in the same year they are provided11 and that Vega and Delta are jointly determined. 
This last assumption reflects the reasonable conjecture that bank board’s set the various 
components of total CEO compensation (salary, bonus, stock grants, stock options, etc.) as a 
package, and Delta and Vega are elasticities that describe the consequences of that total 
compensation decision on CEO wealth incentives12. This assumption has ramifications for our 
identification strategy, i.e., we can use the same identification schemes in both, equation (2) 
and equation (3). 
4.1 Control Variables and Identification Strategy 
We employ parsimonious specifications. Each equation includes three standard bank-level 
control variables which are based primarily on previous literature. First, we include firm size, 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, given that previous research (e.g., Guay, 1999; 
Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009) has documented that size may be an important determinant of 
bank risk, although the sign of the relationship is not clear. In addition, we expect firm size to 
capture variation in the degree of talent and wealth across CEOs. (Smith and Watts, 1992; 
Core and Guay, 1999). We therefore predict a positive relationship between firm size and the 
                                                 
10 For robustness purposes, we have estimated a system of equations by 3sls. Our main results hold under this 
alternative specification.  
11 In alternative specifications, we lag lnVega and lnDelta to allow time for the incentives established in year t-1 to 
generate risk taking in year t. Our results are robust to the lag structure of incentives. 
12 The joint determination of Delta and Vega recognizes that infinite increases in risk-taking behavior are not likely 
to be optimal as a project with infinite risk may not remain a positive NPV project. We assume that compensation 
committees are likely to provide Stock Options to encourage assumption of risky but positive NPV projects. 
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level of equity incentives. Next, we include the ratio of book equity to assets (Equity ratio) to 
accounts for differences in financial leverage across firms. On one hand, leverage may have a 
positive effect on risk and on executive’s incentives toward risk if higher leverage provides 
managers with greater incentives to transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders (Leland, 
1998). On the other hand, a number of studies (e.g., Friend and Lang, 1988; Lewellen, 2006) 
have argued and found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that riskier firms face a higher 
probability of financial distress and, therefore, should have less leverage. This finding suggests a 
negative effect of leverage on risk and on risk-taking incentives since firms may offset the 
increased risk of financial distress that accompanies any increase in leverage by reducing their 
risk. Given these conflicting hypotheses and the conflicting evidence in prior studies, we do not 
make a prediction on the sign of the Equity ratio. Finally we include the Tobin’s Q ratio 
(TobinQ) to account for differences in bank-specific investment opportunities. We expect 
managers of firms with larger investment-opportunity sets and more growth options to take 
more risk than managers of firms with smaller investment-opportunity sets and fewer growth 
options (Guay, 1999). We also expect the consequences of excessive managerial risk aversion 
(i.e., rejecting risky but positive net present value projects) to be more costly to shareholders of 
firms with more investment opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992). Therefore, we expect both 
types of equity incentives to be positively associated with the Tobin’s Q ratio. 
Our specifications also employ some control variables that are not common across 
equations. Our instruments for risk (Delta, Vega) in the Delta and Vega equations (risk 
equation) are based on the determinants identified by prior research that should not have a 
direct effect on equity incentives (risk profile of the firm), but that should have an indirect 
relationship through their effect on risk (and of equity incentives).  
Following De Young et al. (2012), we include local economic conditions during year t 
(EconCond) and a measure of local market concentration (Market Concentration) in the risk 
equation. EconCond is the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s state-level Coincident Index 
of economic conditions. We weight this measure considering on the distribution of each bank’s 
deposits across the various states; hence, this variable exhibits both time series and cross-
sectional variation. We expect that banks facing stronger economic conditions will have more 
capacity for taking risk. Market Concentration is a weighted average of the state herfindahl index 
of deposits concentration. Weights are computed according to the distribution of each bank’s 
deposits across the various states, allowing this variable both time series and cross-sectional 
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variation. We do not provide a prediction on the sign of market concentration as there is no 
clear consensus in the literature on the effect of market concentration on bank risk.  
 The variables, local economic conditions and market concentration, are used as 
instruments for risk (and are therefore excluded from equations (2) and (3)), because they are 
expected to directly influence risk, without affecting executive incentives. On the one hand, 
current economic conditions affect banks’ capacities and opportunities to take risk in the short-
run. On the other hand, a large body of research has shown that market concentration 
influences bank risk (Allen and Gale, 2000, 2004, Hellman et al., 2000; Besanko and Thakor, 
1993; Boot and Greenbaum, 1993; Matutes and Vives, 2000; Caminal and Matutes, 2002), 
although with conflicting theoretical predictions about the sign of the relationship. However, 
transitive aberrations in economic conditions (e.g., a recession) and in market concentration 
should not be a primary influence on compensation committees, as they put long-run risk-
taking incentives for management into place.  
Given our assumption that Delta and Vega are jointly determined, equations (2) and (3) can 
be identically specified. In line with prior literature, we include in both equations the natural 
log of CEO salary during year t (lnSalary) and the number of years the CEO has held his/her 
position (Tenure).We have no a priori expectation for the sign on lnSalary. On the one hand, 
cash compensation allows the CEO to diversify outside the firm (Guay 1999), thus reducing 
risk aversion and permitting lower risk-taking incentives (lower Vega and/or higher Delta). On 
the other hand, high cash compensation may indicate CEO entrenchment (Berger, Ofek, and 
Yermack 1997), thus inducing risk aversion and requiring higher risk-taking incentives (higher 
Vega and/or lower Delta). High values for Tenure may signal horizon problems associated with 
the approach of CEO retirement (Core and Guay 1999); thus, compensation committees may 
design low-Vega and/or high-Delta contracts to ensure the alignment, prudence, and focus of 
these long-tenured CEOs. These variables are excluded from equation 1 since they are used as 
instruments for Delta and Vega as they are not expected to directly influence bank risk. While a 
CEO’s job tenure and base salary are likely to affect the risk preferences and thus require 
compensation committees to adjust the contractual risk incentives (Delta, Vega), it is not the job 
tenure or the salary, but these risk incentives themselves that directly influence risk-taking13. 
                                                 
13 In addition, we note that salary is typically determined through competitive benchmarking, based primarily on 
general industry salary surveys supplemented by detailed analyses of selected industry or market peers 
(Murphy,1999). Therefore, salary, unlike stock options, is not used to encourage or discourage CEO risk-taking. 
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As with any study that uses instrumental variables, the validity of the resulting estimates 
relies on the validity of the exclusion restrictions. The model is reasonably well-identified in all 
specifications. The F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage 
regression of each endogenous regressor reject the null hypothesis, at the 1% level, that the 
instruments EconCond and Market Concentration (Tenure and lnSalary ) are uncorrelated with the 
endogenous regressors Total Risk, Insolvency Risk, Systematic Risk and Idiosyncratic Risk (Vega, 
Delta). In addition, the Kleibergen–Paap underidentification LM and Wald tests reject the null 
hypotheses that the instruments may be inadequate to identify the equation at the 95% level. 
Thus, the specification tests for under-identification suggest that the model is identified, and 
that the instruments are exogenous. In addition, we also present a weak identification test for 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak, following the procedure laid out by Stock 
and Yogo (2005). This test supports the idea that our instruments are strong. As for model 
identification by construction, our set of equations (1), (2) and (3) are exactly identified, i.e., the 
number of included endogenous variables equals the number of excluded instruments.  
5. Measurement of key variables: Risk, Incentives and Ownership Structure. 
5.1 Measurement of bank risk 
To test our hypotheses, we use four primary measures of bank risk: Total Risk, Insolvency 
Risk, Systemic Risk and Idiosyncratic Risk. 
5.1.1 Total Risk 
Following Anderson and Fraser (2000), Total Risk of a bank is calculated as the 
standard deviation of its daily stock returns (Rit) for each fiscal year. The daily stock return is 
calculated as the natural logarithmic of the ratio of equity return series (Rit = ln(Pit/Pit-1), where 
Pit is the stock price, adjusted for any capital adjustment including dividend and stock splits. 
Total Risk captures the overall variability in bank stock returns and reflects the market’s 
perceptions about the risks inherent in assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet positions. In 
addition, it also indicates the ability of bank management to control risk exposures and 
produce steady earnings over time, with high earnings variation implying a more risky bank.  
5.1.2 Insolvency Risk 
The Z-score is a widely used measure of bank’s distance to default (see Boyd and Runkle, 
1993; Beck and Laeven, 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2006; and Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 
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2007), which incorporates three factors: capitalization, the level of profitability, and fluctuations 
in income as follows: 
   
, where ROA stands from Return on Assets, E/A represents equity capital over total assets and 
σ(ROA) is the standard deviation (volatility) of ROA14. We use a three-year rolling time window 
for the standard deviation of ROA to allow for time variation in the denominator of the Z-
score. This approach avoids that the variation in Z-scores within banks over time is exclusively 
driven by variation in the levels of capital and profitability (Schaeck, Čihák and Wolfe, 2010).  
The Z-Score is defined as a state in which losses surmount equity (E<-pi) (where E represents 
equity and pi profits)15 and measures the distance from insolvency (Roy, 1952). Thus the Z- score 
can be viewed as a measure of the likelihood of failure, with a smaller value of the index 
associated with a greater chance of bank failure (more risk).To facilitate the interpretation when 
analyzing the effect of bank ownership structure and executive incentives on bank risk, we 
inverse the Z score to get a measure of the risk of insolvency.  
5.1.3 Systemic and Idiosyncratic Risk. 
Although prior empirical studies have examined the relationship between the incentives 
provided by stock options and total firm risk, several recent theoretical studies (e.g., Tian, 2004; 
Henderson, 2005; Duan and Wei, 2005; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012) suggest that it is 
important to distinguish between the systematic and idiosyncratic component of total risk when 
studying the relationship between stock options and firm risk. These studies show that for a 
fixed level of total risk, increasing the proportion of systematic risk unambiguously increases the 
subjective value of the stock-option holdings of a risk-averse manager who can trade the market 
portfolio. In particular Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) show that stock options gives risk-
averse managers an incentive to increase total risk by increasing systematic rather than 
                                                 
14 Boyd and Graham (1989) consider the question of whether the survival likelihood index computed using 
accounting data or stock market data is a better measure of bankruptcy risk. They conclude that the accounting-
based survival likelihood index conveys “much of the same information that is in commercial paper ratings. The 
market [survival likelihood] indices do not. To the extent, that commercial paper ratings are useful measures of 
bankruptcy risk, these findings favor the use of a survival likelihood index computed with accounting data.” 
15 The probability of insolvency can be expressed as prob (-ROA<E/A), where ROA (=pi/A) is the return on assets. If 
profits are normally distributed, then the inverse of the probability of insolvency equals (ROA+E/A)/σ(ROA), 
where σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA (Leaven and Levine, 2009). Then the Z-score represents the 
number of standard deviations below the mean by which profits would have to fall so as to just deplete equity. 
Even if profits are not normally distributed the Z score is the lower bound of the probability of default (by 
Tchebycheff inequality). A higher Z-score therefore implies a lower probability of insolvency. 
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idiosyncratic risk, since, for a given level of Vega, an increase in systematic risk always results in 
a greater increase in a CEO’s subjective value of his or her stock-option portfolio than does an 
equivalent increase in idiosyncratic risk. Thus, the above distinction between the two 
components of risk is important because it suggests that stock options might not necessarily 
induce CEOs to undertake positive NPV projects that are primarily characterized by 
idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available as an alternative. We explore 
this hypothesis by analyzing the effect of stock options and of ownership structure on both 
systemic and idiosyncratic risk.  
Systemic and Idiosyncratic Risk are calculated using the following two-index market model, 
suggested by Chen et al. (2006) and Anderson and Fraser (2000). This model is estimated for 
each year, for each bank: 
& , & , ,( ) ( )it i S P i S P t I i t itR R I uα β β= + + +                                                                                (4) 
 , where the sub indexes i and t refer to bank and time, respectively. itR  is the daily return on 
bank stock for bank i, & ,S P tR  is the daily return on S&P 500 Banks index
16, tI  is the daily three-
month T-bill yield, and itu is a random error term for bank i. Estimation of this equation 
results in two risk measures, & ,S P iβ  and ,I iβ , which are proxies for systematic and interest rate 
risks respectively. To compute the idiosyncratic risk we calculate the standard deviation of the 
residuals iuσ  from Eq. (1). 
5.2 Measurement of Executive Incentives.  
To measure managerial equity incentives, we use Delta and Vega, since they are two 
characteristics of stock option compensation that have shown, theoretically, to influence bank 
risk (Coles et al., 2006). We define Delta as the change in the dollar value of the executive’s 
wealth for a one percentage point change in stock price. Vega is the change in the dollar value 
of the executive’s wealth for a one percentage point change in the annualized standard 
deviation of stock returns. Guay (1999) shows that option Vega is many times higher than stock 
Vega. Following Knopf et al. (2002) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), we use the Vega of the 
option portfolio as a proxy of the total Vega of the stock and option portfolio. Partial 
derivatives of the option price with respect to stock price (Delta) and stock return volatility 
                                                 
16 The model is also estimated using the S&P 500 Index, our main results hold under this alternative computation 
of systemic and idiosyncratic risk. 
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(Vega) are based on the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model adjusted for dividends by 
Merton (1977).  
We compute Delta and Vega using the full information method (Guay, 1999) for more 
than 90% of the options grants in our sample. For the other 10%, for which we do not have 
information on the exercise prices or on maturities, we follow the literature (Yermack, 1995; 
Hall and Liebman, 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006; Core and Guay, 2002; Guay, 1999; 
Cohen et al., 2000; Datta et al., 2005; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002) and we use the one year 
approximation method developed by Core and Guay (2002) to estimate Delta and Vega. We 
discuss the derivation of Delta and Vega in more detail in Appendix 1. 
5.3 Measurement of Ownership Structure. 
We consider three characteristics of ownership structure: concentration, type of the largest 
shareholder and the total shareholdings by type. First, we measure the bank’s ownership 
concentration by the fraction of the bank’s equity capital held, either directly or indirectly, by 
the largest shareholder (SH1). This variable is a proxy for both, the relative power of the 
dominant shareholder and the degree of ownership concentration. To add robustness to our 
analysis, we also use two alternatives measures of ownership concentration: the Herfindahl 
index of concentration and the total shareholding of the three largest shareholders.  
Second, we differentiate between different types of the largest shareholders. In doing so, we 
follow previous literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Barca and Becht, 2001; Tribó et al., 2007) 
and we categorize shareholders into four main types: families, corporations, banks, and 
institutional investors. A family-dominated bank is defined as a bank where an individual 
investors or a group of individual investors with family ties is the largest shareholder. 
Corporate-dominated banks and bank-dominated banks are defined as banks where the largest 
shareholder is a corporation and a bank, respectively. Finally, institutional-dominated banks are 
banks where investment advisors, hedge funds, pension funds or mutual funds have the largest 
stake. To analyze how the overall relationship between concentration and bank risk differs by 
the type of the largest shareholder, we interact our ownership concentration variable (SH1) with 
the ownership type variable.  
Finally in order to captures the amount of concentration for each group of shareholders, 
we compute the total shareholdings of each type of shareholders. 
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To produce a more symmetric data distribution we use the log transformation of a) 
insolvency risk and total risk, b) Delta and Vega, c) ownership structure variables. 
6. Results 
6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the variables in our models. To reduce the 
influence of extreme values, the distributions of all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles of their sample distributions. Vega has a mean value of $11,765 and Delta has a 
mean of $90,715, which means that, on average, a CEO enjoys an increase of $11,576 in 
his/her equity portfolio for a 0.01 increase in stock return volatility, and an increase of $90,715 
for a 1% increase in the stock price. The value of Delta is mostly driven by the CEO portfolio 
of equity. On average, CEOs hold a 2.56% ownership stake and earn approximately $352,822 
in salary, $234,498 in bonuses, $282,622 in long term compensation, $56,887 in perk and 
other compensation, $165,258 in non-equity incentives plans, $231,120 in stock award and 
$273,485 in option grants. 
----------- Insert Table 2 about here ----------- 
Our sample covers a wide range of banks, from very small to extremely large banks. The 
smallest bank in our sample is First Capital Bancshares, Inc with a mean total asset of $27 
million, while the larger bank in our sample is Citigroup with a mean value of total asset of $ 
1,120 billion. The descriptive statistic for our risk measures show that the average bank in our 
sample has a Total Risk of 2.3, an Insolvency Risk of 2.3, a Systemic Risk of 0.489, and an 
Idiosyncratic Risk of 0.0318. These values are comparable to those reported by Anderson and 
Fraser (2000) and by Pathan (2009). In terms of ownership, the average stake by the largest 
shareholder is 10.5 percent while the Herfindahl index of concentration is 0.029. Furthermore, 
considerable variability is found in ownership concentration across banks. Regarding the type 
of the largest shareholders, in 34 percent of our sample the largest shareholder is a family, in 
16.5 percent it concerns a corporation, in 7.7 percent it constitutes a bank and in almost 42 
percent of our sample it relates to an institutional investor. In terms of total shareholdings by 
type, on average, family investors hold 12 percent, corporations hold 3.6 percent, banks have 
1.3 percent, and institutional investors hold 20.3 percent. The rest of the shares are held by 
unidentified shareholders with less than 0.01 percent stake.  
----------- Insert Table 3 about here ----------- 
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The correlation matrix in table 3 shows, consistent with our expectation, that Vega is 
positively related with total risk, Insolvency risk and Idiosyncratic risk. Delta, on the other 
hand, is negatively related with Total Risk and positively related with Insolvency Risk, Systemic 
Risk and Idiosyncratic Risk. Furthermore, ownership concentration is positively related to 
Delta and Vega, as well as total risk and idiosyncratic risk and insolvency risk, but negatively 
related to systemic risk. The stakes by different groups of shareholder are significantly related to 
Delta, Vega and our risk measures.  
----------- Insert Table 4 about here ----------- 
In table 4, we compare the mean values of risk, executive compensation, ownership 
structure, size and market value by splitting our sample according to the type of the largest 
shareholder. We find that Vega is largest in banks were an institutional investor is the largest 
shareholder, while banks were a family is the largest shareholder provide significantly lower 
Delta, have a higher total and idiosyncratic risk and a lower systemic risk, compared to all other 
types.  
With respect to differences in the ownership structure, the descriptive statistics show that if 
corporations and banks hold a considerable stake in a bank, it is mainly as a controlling 
shareholder (with an average stake above 17%) as they have a very low presence as secondary 
shareholders. The stake of the largest shareholder when it concerns an institution investor is 
7.35 percent and 11.59 percent for family owners. When we relate these stakes to the average 
market capitalization of these banks, $7.37 billion and $0.283 billion respectively, they 
represent an average investment of $541 million for institutional investors and $32 million for 
family owners. If we consider the average and median market value of these large institutional 
investors, we obtain that a 7.35 stake represents an average investment of 2.1 percent and a 
median investment of around 18 percent, which represent an important share of their total 
investment portfolio. For family owners, we do not have data on their total wealth, but we 
believe family owners to have a substantial part of their wealth invested. Furthermore, 
institutional investors have an important stake, as a group, in all banks but are especially well 
represented in those banks where the largest shareholder is an institutional investor with a total 
stake above 30 percent. In terms of size, banks where the largest shareholder is a family or a 
corporation tend to be substantially smaller. Banks where another bank is the largest 
shareholder are about 5 times larger than family banks in market value and total assets, while 
banks where an institutional investor is the largest shareholder tend to be about 25 times larger. 
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6.2. Main Results. 
Tables 5 to 9 show the second stage regression of equations (1), (2) and (3). In each table, 
we include one model for each of our four risk measures, along with Delta and Vega, and one 
measure of ownership structure. In Tables 5 to 7 we analyze the effect of ownership 
concentration on bank risk, Delta and Vega. In table 5 we define ownership concentration as 
the fraction of the bank’s equity capital held, either directly or indirectly, by the largest 
shareholder (SH1). In tables 6-7, we repeat our analysis with alternative measures of ownership 
concentration: the Herfindahl index of concentration (HHI) in table 6, and the total 
shareholding of the three largest shareholders (sh1-3), in table 7. Then, in table 8, we 
decompose the effect of SH1 on bank risk by the type of the largest shareholders. In table 9, we 
look at the effect of the total shareholding held by each type of investor on bank risk. The 
estimates of these second- stage regression represents the direct effect of each independent 
variable on the dependent variable in each equation. Finally, for each model in tables 5 to 9, we 
decompose the total effect of Vega and Delta on risk (table 10) and the total effect of the 
ownership variables on risk, Vega and Delta (tables 11 -13) into a direct and an indirect effect.  
See appendix 2 for a description of how the computation of the direct and indirect effect.  
6.2.1 Equity Incentives and Bank Risk. 
We begin the regression analysis by examining the relationship between equity incentives 
and bank risk. The estimates displayed in table 5-9 strongly indicate that bank risk is directly 
influenced by the CEO incentives, but that bank risk does not directly influence CEO 
incentives. The estimated coefficients of Vega (Delta) are significantly positive (negative) at the 
10% (1%) level in all models, with one exception (Vega and Delta does not influence systemic 
risk in any model). Our findings, that higher Vega (Delta) has a positive (negative) direct effect 
on risk, are in line with existing literature (e.g., Knopf et al. 2002; Coles et al., 2006; DeYoung 
et al., 2012) and provide support for our hypothesis H2a and H2b. However, the analysis of the 
direct effect of Vega and Delta on bank risk (through the structural coefficients in tables 5-9) is 
incomplete, since it does not take into account the endogenous nature of Vega, Delta and risk. 
A change in Vega (Delta) leads to a simultaneous change in risk and in Delta (Vega), which feed 
back through the system to further affect risk. Thus, the total effect of Vega (Delta) on risk is 
given by the direct effect of Vega (Delta) on bank risk and by the indirect effect that Vega 
(Delta) has on risk through Delta (Vega). 
----------- Insert Tables 5-9 about here ----------- 
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 To compute the indirect effect of Vega (Delta) on bank risk, we consider the direct effect 
of Vega (Delta) on Delta (Vega), as well as the direct effect of Delta (Vega) on bank risk. The 
result on the effect of Vega on Delta, and vice versa, is consistent across all models (see table 5-
9). In particular, we find a positive and significant coefficient of Vega in the Delta regressions 
and a positive coefficient of Delta in the Vega regressions. Therefore, given that Delta (Vega) 
has a negative (positive) direct effect on bank risk, an increase in Vega (Delta) leads to a 
reduction (an increase) of bank risk, through Delta (Vega). Overall, the positive direct effect of 
Vega on risk is higher than the negative indirect effect of Vega on risk via Delta, leading to an 
overall positive effect of Vega on bank risk. In contrast, on overall, the direct negative effect of 
Delta is smaller than the indirect positive effect of Delta on bank risk via Vega, which leads to a 
total positive effect of Delta on bank risk. These results hold for all our measures of risk except 
for systemic risk (see table 10). To illustrate our findings, we use the coefficient estimates in 
table 10, model 1, to compute the magnitude of the relationship between Vega, Delta and bank 
risk.  
----------- Insert Table 10 about here ----------- 
The direct effect of a one standard deviation increase in ln Vega (8.75) yields a 0.54% 
increase in total risk (8.75*0.016), while the indirect effect of a one standard deviation increase 
in ln Vega yields a 0.42% decrease in total risk via Delta (8.75*-0.0484). The sum of the two 
effects leads to a total increase of risk of 0.12%. In turn, the direct effect of a one standard 
deviation increase in ln Delta (8.05) yields a 0.58% decrease in total risk ( 8.05*-0.0718) while 
the indirect effect of a one standard deviation increase in ln Delta yields a 0.73% increase in 
total risk via Vega (8.05*0.0913). The sum of the two effects leads to a total increase of risk of 
0.15%. Thus, the risk increasing effect of high-Vega contracts dominates the risk aversion 
effects of high-Delta contracts such that a one standard deviation increase in Delta and Vega 
yields a 0.27% increase in total risk (0.11%+0.15%). 
These results show the importance of looking beyond the direct effect, as the structural 
form coefficient may misstates the sign of the relation between the variables of interest. 
Previous studies analyzing the relationship between Vega, Delta and bank risk have based their 
interpretation on structural form coefficients and conclude that Delta has a negative effect on 
bank risk and that compensation committees exhibit risk-mitigating responses by balancing 
high CEO Vegas with complementarily high CEO Deltas. We show that the overall effect of 
Delta on risk is positive, when taking into account the indirect effect of Delta on risk through 
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Vega. These findings suggest that shareholder use Vega to mitigate the risk-reducing effect of 
Delta to further increase bank risk.  
6.2.2 Ownership Concentration, CEO incentives and bank risk. 
The estimates displayed in table 5-7 show the direct effect of ownership concentration, on 
CEO incentives and on the bank’s total risk, insolvency risk, systemic risk and idiosyncratic 
risk. The coefficients of the ownership concentration variable (SH1 in table 5, HHI in table 6 
and SH1-3 in table 7) shows, in all our models, a significant negative direct effect on Vega, a 
significant positive direct effect on Delta and a significant positive effect on all our measures of 
risk with one exception (SH1 does not affect systemic risk). These results suggest that large 
shareholders have preferences toward lower risk levels which are reflected in low risk-sensitive 
CEO incentive contracts (low-Vega, high-Delta contracts) and that the risk increasing effect of 
opportunistic behavior dominates the risk reducing effect of higher monitoring efforts by 
undiversified shareholders. We confirm our expectation on the risk preferences of large 
shareholders by computing the indirect effect of ownership concentration on bank risk via Vega 
and Delta in table 11. 
For all our measures of ownership concentration and bank risk, we find that ownership 
concentration has a significant negative indirect effect on bank risk via Vega and Delta. These 
findings provide strong support for our hypothesis 1-a and 1-b, stating that ownership 
concentration has a negative effect on bank risk via executive incentives, and a positive direct 
effect through the opportunistic behavior of large shareholders (which dominates the 
monitoring effect). Overall, the negative indirect effect is dominated by the direct positive effect 
leading to a total positive effect of ownership concentration on bank risk. This finding provides 
support to hypothesis 1-c by showing that the increase in risk introduced by higher type II 
agency problems dominates the reduction in risk due to the reduction of type I agency 
problems at concentrated banks.  
To exemplify these results, we describe the effect of a 10% increase in the stake held by the 
largest shareholder on total risk. Using the coefficient estimates in table 11, the direct effect of 
a 10% increase in SH1 leads to a 1.2% increase in total risk. In contrast, the indirect effect of a 
10% increase in SH1 leads to a 0.022% decrease in total risk via Vega and to a 0.95% decrease 
via Delta. Thus, a 10% increase in the total shareholding of the largest shareholder reduces the 
bank total risk by 0.97 %, through the design of CEO incentives. The sum of the direct and 
indirect effect show that a 10% increase in SH1 leads to a total increase of risk of 0.23%. Our 
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finding of a positive relation between ownership concentration and bank risk is in line with 
previous literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John, Litov, and Yeung, 2008, Leaven and 
Levine, 2009). The magnitude of the relationship reported by this literature is also in line with 
the magnitude that we obtain for the direct effect of concentration on bank risk. However, 
previous studies did not consider the indirect effect, which reduces the size of the positive effect 
of ownership concentration on bank risk.  
----------- Insert Table 11 about here ----------- 
6.2.3 Types of the largest shareholders, CEO incentives and bank risk 
Table 8 decomposes the stake held by the largest shareholder by type. When the largest 
shareholder is a family or an institution, we find that SH1 has a negative (positive) significant 
direct effect on Vega (Delta), and a positive significant effect on bank risk. These results hold 
for all our models, with one exception. We do not report a significant relationship between 
SH1*Institution and Vega, and between SH1*Family and systemic risk in model 3. When a 
corporation is the largest shareholder, our result show that SH1 has a significant direct positive 
effect on total risk, insolvency risk and idiosyncratic risk, and a negative (positive) direct effect 
on Vega (Delta) in models 1 and 3. Finally, when the largest shareholder is a bank, SH1 only 
has a significant negative effect on systemic risk and on Delta in model 3. 
Next, in table 11, we compute the direct, indirect and total effect of SH1 on bank risk, for 
each type of shareholders and for each measure of risk, to analyze whether the strength of the 
relationship between SH1 and bank risk depends on the type of the largest shareholder. 
Overall, our findings show that, when the largest shareholder is a family, institutional 
investor or a corporation, SH1 has a positive (negative) direct (indirect) effect on bank risk and 
that the direct positive effect dominates the indirect negative effect which leads to a total 
positive effect of SH1 on bank risk. These effects (direct, indirect and total) are strongest for 
family banks and weakest for institutional investors. Only when a bank is the largest 
shareholder, we find a negative direct effect of SH1 on systemic risk. These findings provide 
support to hypothesis H3a17. 
In particular, our results show that when the largest shareholder is a family or an 
institution, SH1 has both a significant positive direct effect and a significant indirect negative 
                                                 
17 We also compare between the types of the largest shareholder, to test whether the differences between types are 
significant. Particularly, we find that the effect of SH1 on bank risk, both directly and through Delta and Vega, is 
significantly different when the largest shareholder is a family compared to when it concerns an institutional 
investor or a bank (undisclosed tables). 
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effect on all our measures of bank risk (with the exception of systemic risk which is not 
significantly affected by SH1 if the largest shareholder is a family). When a corporation is the 
largest shareholder, SH1 has both, a significant positive direct and a negative indirect effect on 
total risk and a direct positive effect on insolvency risk and idiosyncratic risk. Finally, SH1 has a 
significant negative direct effect on systemic risk and a positive significant indirect effect on 
insolvency risk, when a bank is the largest shareholder.  
To illustrate our findings, we describe the direct and indirect effect of a 10% increase in 
SH1 by each type of shareholder on total risk. The coefficient estimates in table 12 show that a 
10% increase in SH1 yields a 1.8% increase in total risk via the direct effect, when it concerns a 
family shareholder. However this positive effect is mostly offset by the negative indirect effect. 
In particular, a 10% increase in SH1 when it concerns a family shareholder yields a 0.25% 
decrease in total risk through Vega and a 1.4% decrease in total risk via Delta. Thus, the 
indirect effect reduces the total risk by 1.6% which leads to a total effect of 0.22%, when the 
largest shareholder is a family. This total effect is lower when the largest shareholder is a 
corporation or an institutional investor. When the largest shareholder is a corporation a 10% 
increase on its shareholdings leads to a direct positive and significant increase of 1.3% in total 
risk and to a negative significant indirect decrease of 1.174% in total risk, which leads to a total 
effect of 0.16%. Finally, a 10% increase in SH1 for an institutional controlling shareholder 
leads to a 1.2% increase in total risk via the direct effect and to a decrease in total risk of 1.128 
% via the indirect effect. Then, the 10% increase in SH1 for an institutional controlling 
shareholder leads to a 0.073% increase in total risk. The direct effect of an increase of SH1 
when it concerns a bank is not significant. 
----------- Insert Table 12 about here ----------- 
6.2.4 Total shareholdings by shareholders type, CEO incentives and bank risk 
Finally, we analyze how different types of owners, as a group, influence risk and CEO 
compensation. Table 9 shows a strong positive direct effect of the total stake held by 
individuals/families on all measures of bank risk and Delta, and a negative direct effect on 
Vega. The same effects, although smaller, are found for institutional investors for all measures 
of risk, except for model 4 where not significant effect is found between the total shareholding 
of institutional investors and Vega and Delta. Bank and corporate shareholdings have no 
significant direct effect on any measure of risk. But they have a negative direct effect on Delta in 
all our models. In addition, bank shareholdings have a positive direct effect on Vega, in all our 
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models, while corporate shareholdings have a positive direct effect on Vega in model 4. To 
further understand the influence of each type of investor as a group on bank risk, we compute 
the indirect and total effect of the total stake held by each type of shareholders in table 13. The 
estimates show that, while family shareholdings have a significant negative indirect effect on 
bank risk via Vega and Delta, institutional shareholdings aim to induce higher risk via the 
design of CEO compensation. In particular, we find that institutional shareholdings have a) a 
positive indirect effect on bank risk via Vega and b) a negative indirect effect via Delta, such 
that the positive indirect effect via Vega dominates the negative indirect effect via Delta, leading 
to total positive indirect effect of institutional shareholdings on bank risk. These results hold 
for all our models, except for model 3 where institutional shareholdings do not have a 
significant influence on Delta and Vega. The sum of the direct and indirect effect leads to a 
total positive effect of family and institutional shareholdings on bank risk.  
Corporations and banks do not have a significant direct effect on bank risk but they 
influence total and insolvency risk via the design of CEO incentives. On the one hand, 
corporate shareholdings increase bank risk via their direct negative effect on Delta. However 
this negative direct effect feeds back through the system, leading to a negative indirect effect on 
total and insolvency risk via Vega, which dominates the indirect positive effect via Delta. On 
the other hand, bank shareholdings increase bank total and insolvency risk through their direct 
positive (negative) effect on Vega (Delta), which translates into a positive direct effect on risk.  
----------- Insert Table 13 about here ----------- 
To illustrate our results, we describe the effect of a 10% increase in the total shareholding 
held by family, institutions, banks and corporate shareholdings on total risk. A 10% increase in 
the shareholdings held by families increases the bank total risk by 2.5% via the direct effect. 
This increase is offset by the negative indirect effect of family shareholdings on total risk via 
Vega and Delta which leads to a reduction on bank total risk of 2.4% (0.4% via Vega and 2% 
via Delta). These results are quite similar to the results obtained for large family owners. This is 
expected given that family ownership is especially high in those banks where the largest 
shareholder is a family, and that family shareholders play a much smaller role in other types of 
banks. A 10% increase in the shareholdings held by institutions increases total risk by 0.13%. 
This increase is the result of a positive direct effect which leads to a 0.8% increase in total risk 
and a positive indirect effect which increases the total risk by 0.4% (1.8% via Vega and -1.3% 
via Delta). These results are expected, given the average degree of diversification of each 
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institutional investor. Finally, a 10% increase in corporate shareholdings leads to a 0.14% 
reduction in total risk through Delta, while an increase in bank shareholdings leads to a 0.3% 
increase in total risk, through Delta and Vega. 
7. Robustness 
Thus far, we have shown that our results are robust to a) alternatives definition of risk and 
ownership concentration; b) the estimation technique, as our results hold when estimating the 
system of equations by 3SLS; c) the time structure of the model as our findings hold under 
alternatives specifications in which we lag Vega and Delta, to allow time for the incentives 
established in year t-1 to generate risk taking in year t. In addition, we check for the existence of 
two potential endogeneity problems in our regressions that may affect our results: the 
endogenous nature of ownership and leverage.  
Some studies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999, Gugler and Weigland, 
2003) raise the problem that ownership might be endogenous as it might be influenced by the 
level of performance and risk of the firm. In our study, it can be argued that investors can be 
attracted by banks with different risk levels. Some investors might simply choose to invest in 
banks with higher risk profiles in order to maximize their utility. Therefore we check whether 
ownership structure may be treated as an endogenous variable by performing the “GMM 
distance” test of the endogeneity of regressors. We do so by considering the average 
shareholding of the largest shareholder in other banking companies by state of operation as 
instrument for ownership concentration, the average shareholding of the largest shareholder by 
type in other banking companies by state of operation as instrument for each type of largest 
shareholder, and the average total shareholdings of each type of shareholders in other banking 
companies by state of operation as instrument for total shareholdings by type18. The test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that ownership structure may be treated as exogenous, at the 5% level. 
Another concern with the risk-profile equations is that leverage could be endogenous. This 
concern is particularly acute in any study that examines CEO risk-taking incentives, since both a 
bank’s capital structure and the risk-taking incentives of its CEO are likely to be jointly 
determined to produce the desired risk profile (Coles et al., 2006; Lewellen, 2006). We, 
therefore, test whether our research design also needs to account for the endogenous nature of 
bank leverage, by performing the “GMM distance” test of the endogeneity of regressors. 
Following Armstrong and Vashistha (2012), we instrument leverage with the bank’s recent 
                                                 
18 We verify the validity of the instruments for each of our ownership variables and they are all valid instruments. 
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performance, measured as the previous two years’ stock returns19. The test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that leverage may be treated as exogenous, at the 5% level. 
8. Conclusions 
Most previous studies on the relationship between ownership structure and bank risk focus 
on the direct effect of concentration on bank risk, with the implicit assumptions that all 
shareholders are risk neutral and prefer more risk to less. Our paper considers differences in 
risk preferences and type I and type II agency problems of different types of shareholders 
(families, institutions, corporations and banks) to analyze the mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between ownership structure and bank risk, for a large sample of US banks over 
the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership 
concentration has a total positive effect on bank risk and that this effect can be decomposed 
into a positive direct effect, and a negative indirect effect. While the positive direct effect is the 
result of large shareholders’ opportunistic behavior and monitoring, the indirect effect works 
through managerial incentive contracts. We find that large shareholders reduce bank risk by 
designing low-Vega and high-Delta incentive contracts. Thus, our results show that executive 
incentives are an important mechanism for shareholders to induce their preferred risk-level.  
Our findings reveal that not all types of shareholders have the same preferences toward 
risk, as we find that the strength of the positive direct and negative indirect effect depends on 
the type of the largest shareholder. The positive direct and negative indirect effects are strongest 
when the largest shareholder is a family and weakest when it concerns a bank or corporation. 
Finally, we look at the effect of total shareholdings by type on bank risk. We find that 
institutional shareholdings have a positive direct and indirect effect on bank risk. In contrast, 
family shareholdings show a positive direct effect and a negative indirect effect, which results in 
a positive total effect. Finally, corporate and bank shareholdings are very small compared to 
institutional and family ownership, when it concerns a non-controlling stakes. As a result, we 
do not find a significant direct effect on bank risk, although they have an indirect effect via the 
design of CEO incentives. 
                                                 
19 This measure of bank performance should exhibit a positive relationship with a bank’s total assets, which is the 
denominator of our measure of leverage, and are therefore relevant instruments. There is no obvious reason to 
expect a direct relationship between our measures of a firm’s past performance and its current risk profile, other 
than the effect through equity incentives and the control variables such as leverage, which suggests that these are 
valid instruments. In addition the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage regression 
as well as the Kleibergen–Paap underidentification LM and Wald tests rejects the null hypotheses that the 
instruments may be inadequate to identify the equation at the 95% level. 
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Regarding the effect of managerial incentives on bank risk, we show that Vega has a 
positive direct effect on bank risk, while Delta has a negative direct effect. In addition, we show 
that an increase in Vega (Delta) has a negative (positive) indirect effect on risk via Delta (Vega). 
Overall, the positive (negative) direct effect of Vega (Delta) on risk is higher (lower) than the 
negative (positive) indirect effect of Vega (Delta) on risk via Delta (Vega), which leads to an 
overall positive relationship between Vega (Delta) and Risk. 
Our research has implications for academics, practitioners and policymakers, and 
contributes to the debate on the influence of corporate governance practices and managerial 
incentives on bank risk. Our findings suggest that ownership structure is an important factor to 
be considered when analyzing the relationship between bank risk and the design of managerial 
incentives. The bank ownership structure may moderate the effect of regulation of corporate 
governance practices on bank risk. These results are also important for research analyzing the 
role of other governance mechanisms on risk (or performance), both for financial and non-
financial institutions. 
While our findings lend some legitimacy to arguments in favor of government intervention 
to limit executive risk-taking incentives at financial institutions, it may be a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition. The final result of such government intervention may depend on the 
bank’s ownership structure. For instance, our results only provides some support to the “say on 
pay strategy”, when the largest shareholders suffer from underdiversification or from extended 
liability effects. In such case, government intervention to limit CEO risk-taking incentives 
could, at best strengthen, and at worst interfere with, the compensation-based risk mitigation 
behavior exhibited by shareholders with preferences toward lower risk-levels. In contrast, 
regulation at banks with shareholders who are able to diversify, should probably not give more 
power to shareholders to set CEO risk-taking incentives as they all prefer more to less. In 
addition, to reduce bank risk, regulation could focus on reducing type II agency problems 
which, according to our results, lead to higher bank risk.  
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Figure 1: Relationship between the Ownership structure, Managerial Incentives 
and Bank Risk 
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Table 1: Sample selection details 
Sample selection criteria 
# bank-year obs. 
Executive compensation on SNL Financial database 1997-2007 5116 
 
Less  
Bank-years without CEO compensation data in the two prior years 953 
Bank-years with less than 50 trading days 1139 
Bank-years without accurate ownership structure data 655 
Bank-years without control variables 45 
 
Total  2324 
 
Sample distribution by year 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
N obs. 66 64 119 170 185 220 230 239 240 390 401 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Risk 2323 0.023 0.014 0.006 0.214 
Z-Score 2324 133.382 164.242 -0.290 1867.000 
Insolvency Risk 2324 0.023 0.106 -3.493 2.776 
Systemic Risk 2321 0.489 0.654 -6.050 8.230 
Idiosyncratic Risk 2321 0.032 0.017 0.010 0.490 
Vega 2324 11765 111438 0.000 2689574 
Delta 2324 90715 406240 0.000 9582742 
Stake of the largest shareholder (SH1) 2324 10.573 10.728 0.700 75.210 
Stake of the 3 largest shareholder 2324 18.806 12.189 1.750 95.800 
HHI of Ownership Concentration 2324 0.029 0.064 0.000 0.590 
SH1 is a Family 2324 0.340 0.474 0.000 1.000 
SH1 is a Corporation 2324 0.165 0.371 0.000 1.000 
SH1 is a bank 2324 0.077 0.266 0.000 1.000 
SH1 is a Inst. investor  2324 0.418 0.493 0.000 1.000 
SH1*SH1 is a Family 2324 3.946 8.502 0.000 71.860 
SH1*SH1 is a Corporation 2324 2.808 9.528 0.000 75.210 
SH1*SH1 is a bank 2324 0.748 2.908 0.000 48.480 
SH1*SH1 is a Inst. investor 2324 3.071 4.683 0.000 35.560 
Total shareholdings of Families 2324 12.047 12.749 0.000 79.760 
Total shareholdings of Corporations 2324 3.590 9.957 0.000 77.530 
Total shareholdings of Inst. investors 2324 20.289 18.723 0.000 97.560 
Total shareholdings of Banks 2324 1.291 3.196 0.000 35.560 
Total Assets (in milions) 2324 18800 115000 27.873 1900000 
Market Capitalization (in milions) 2324 3379 18754 2.6 273598 
Leverage 2324 9.267 3.038 1.670 53.820 
Tobin’s Q 2324 0.907 0.030 0.460 0.980 
Economic Impact 2324 141.953 12.889 0.000 217.580 
Market Concentration 2324 0.109 0.056 0.000 0.570 
tenure 2324 4.364 2.858 0.000 11.000 
Base salary 2324 352822 238757 0.000 2400000 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix of our main variables of interest 
Total 
Risk (ln) 
Insolv. 
Risk (ln) 
Systemic 
Risk 
Idios. 
Risk 
Vega 
(ln) 
Delta 
(ln) SH1 
Tot 
Banks 
Tot 
Corp. 
Tot 
Instit. 
Insolvency Risk 0.022 1.000   
(0.290)   
Systemic Risk -0.156 -0.013 1.000   
(0.000) (0.529)   
Idiosyncratic 0.272 -0.013 -0.001 1.000   
(0.000) (0.516) (0.955)   
Vega (ln) 0.074 0.046 0.030 0.025 1.000  
(0.000) (0.024) (0.133) (0.215)   
Delta (ln) -0.097 0.022 0.136 0.062 0.463 1.000 
(0.000) (0.286) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)  
SH1 0.035 0.023 -0.045 0.041 0.078 0.098 1.000 
(0.079) (0.259) (0.024) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tot Banks -0.060 -0.025 0.107 -0.088 -0.156 -0.173 0.012 1.000 
(0.003) (0.214) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.547) 
Tot Corporations 0.005 0.022 -0.082 0.043 -0.041 0.040 0.662 -0.084 1.000 
(0.821) (0.274) (0.000) (0.033) (0.038) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tot Insitutions -0.295 0.010 0.492 -0.125 0.173 0.170 -0.060 -0.033 -0.115 1.000 
(0.000) (0.632) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.095) (0.000) 
Tot Family 0.196 0.033 -0.209 0.170 0.193 0.247 0.368 -0.148 -0.087 -0.341 
(0.000) (0.107) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
P-values between ( ) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Difference of means by largest shareholder type 
(1) (2) (3) (4) Difference of means test 
SH1 is a 
Family 
SH1 is a 
Bank 
SH1 is a 
Corporation 
SH1 is an 
Inst. Investor (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (1) - (4) 
N 791 178 384 971 
Total Risk 0.0277 0.0212 0.0229 0.0198 0.0064*** 0.0047*** 0.0079*** 
Insolvency Risk(ln) 0.0224 0.0134 0.0261 0.0231 0.0090 -0.0037 -0.0007 
Systemic Risk 0.3043 0.6255 0.3500 0.6627 -0.3212*** -0.0457 -0.3584*** 
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.0357 0.0262 0.0331 0.0294 0.0095*** 0.0026*** 0.0063*** 
Vega 7583.34 342.06 2420.97 20960.62 7241.27 5162.37 -13377.28*** 
Delta 124923.70 27836.38 35293.86 96287.27 97087.32*** 89629.84*** 28636.43* 
Stake of the largest 
shareholder (SH1) 11.592 9.7488 17.0106 7.3495 1.8432* -5.4186*** 4.2425*** 
Total Family stake  23.2527 5.3891 8.9912 5.3474 17.8636*** 14.2615*** 17.9053*** 
Total Corporate stake 0.6727 0.5079 18.1654 0.7732 0.1648 -17.4927*** -0.1005 
Total stake of Inst. inv 9.3423 13.2514 15.7962 32.2735 -3.9091** -6.4539*** -22.9312*** 
Total Bank stake 0.3338 10.2519 0.7129 0.6552 -9.9181*** -0.3791 -0.3214 
Market Capitalization 
(in milions) 283.4 1646.2 394.7 7367.9 -1362.8*** -111.3*** -7084.5*** 
Total Assets (in milions) 1725807 7906346 2360300 4.13E+07 -6180539*** -634493 -39574193*** 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test for variable coefficients). 
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Table 5: Second stage regression estimates of equations (1), (2) and (3) on SH1 shareholdings (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 ) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Total Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Insolv. Risk 
Risk 
Ln Vega Ln Delta Syst. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Idio. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta 
Ln Vega 0.0616* 0.6743** 0.0138* 0.6587** 0.0328 0.6821*** 0.0003* 0.6784*** 
(0.0350) (0.3138) (0.0078) (0.3062) (0.0308) (0.2339) (0.0002) (0.2614) 
Ln Delta -0.0718*** 1.4829** -0.0082** 1.5181** 0.0017 1.4660*** -0.0001* 1.4740*** 
(0.0160) (0.6901) (0.0036) (0.7058) (0.0139) (0.5027) (0.0001) (0.5678) 
Sh1 0.1194** -1.9567* 1.3195** 0.0299*** -1.9990* 1.3168* 0.0380 -1.9266* 1.3142** 0.0004** -1.9758* 1.3405** 
(0.0482) (1.0978) (0.5492) (0.0114) (1.0715) (0.7328) (0.0379) (1.0280) (0.5889) (0.0002) (1.1171) (0.6043) 
Total Risk -0.3806 0.2566 
(7.7060) (5.1144) 
Insolvency Risk 0.7631 -0.5027 
(41.1170) (27.2382) 
Systemic Risk -0.4434 0.3024 
(9.2897) (6.3147) 
Idiosyncratic Risk 96.5616 -65.5122 
(2034.5592) (1368.1627) 
Ln Ta 0.0344 -6.6526 4.4861*** 0.0181 -6.9838* 4.6002*** 0.5276*** -6.2585 4.2692 0.0015* -6.5707** 4.4579*** 
(0.1205) (4.6351) (1.3404) (0.0297) (4.0728) (0.8411) (0.1048) (4.9068) (3.2967) (0.0008) (3.3150) (0.8980) 
Leverage -0.5558*** 5.4911 -3.7029 -0.3315 5.0442 -3.3226 0.3276* 5.6770 -3.8726 -0.0003 5.5596 -3.7719* 
(0.2095) (3.5827) (2.4362) (0.4548) (11.9633) (8.7664) (0.1896) (4.9602) (2.9365) (0.0014) (3.7005) (2.0741) 
Tobin Q -2.0367 32.4283 -21.8676 -1.9928 22.9791 -15.1364 1.9839 32.6926 -22.3011 -0.0002 32.4891 -22.0422 
(1.9757) (37.3931) (21.5666) (3.6997) (82.7097) (57.9294) (1.6846) (38.7508) (23.6066) (0.0119) (37.2252) (21.9005) 
Economic  Conditions 0.0048 -0.0003 -0.0023 -0.0000 
(0.0044) (0.0011) (0.0038) (0.0000) 
Market Concentration -0.8912 0.1970 -1.0750*** 0.0020 
(0.5823) (0.1391) (0.4081) (0.0036) 
tenure -0.8423 0.5680* -0.8419 0.5546*** -0.8089* 0.5518*** -0.8219 0.5576*** 
(0.8067) (0.2934) (0.6756) (0.1976) (0.4795) (0.1744) (0.5243) (0.1568) 
Ln cash Compensation -1.9984 1.3476** -1.9842 1.3070** -1.9547** 1.3334** -1.9228** 1.3045* 
(1.4451) (0.6641) (1.2980) (0.5947) (0.7981) (0.5363) (0.8157) (0.7110) 
Nº  observations 2323 2323 2323 2324 2324 2324 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Nª Banks 444 444 444 446 446 446 443 443 443 443 443 443 
F-stat first stage  
Risk 11.98*** 11.98*** 2.07 2.07 2.90* 2.90* 0.48 0.48 
Vega 14.66*** 12.34*** 14.47*** 12.16*** 14.64*** 12.36*** 14.64*** 12.36*** 
Delta 43.29*** 4.06** 42.27*** 3.67** 43.28*** 4.06** 43.28*** 4.06**        
Endogeneity test-GMM 54.3920*** 19.0677*** 5.3374*** 7.2179*** 20.3135*** 1.7942*** 1.2157*** 20.2462*** 2.4488*** 7.8928*** 20.3469*** 2.2705*** 
Underidentification test 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM  stat 8.6668 4.1993 6.4079 8.6096 2.9251 3.9735 8.6780 5.2296 5.3137 8.6780 0.9026 0.8861 
Underidentification-P value 0.0032 0.0404 0.0114 0.0033 0.0872 0.0462 0.0032 0.0222 0.0212 0.0032 0.3421 0.3465 
Weak identification test  
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat 3.511 1.963 3.097 3.504 1.287 1.620 3.515 2.855 2.936 3.515 0.441 0.435 
F- second stage 20.5038*** 6.8231*** 95.4979*** 2.5360*** 6.5357*** 97.5356*** 46.1357*** 7.0229*** 95.9775*** 1.4394*** 6.8791*** 94.9052*** 
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Table 6: Second stage regression estimates of equations (1), (2) and (3) on Herfindahl Index of concentration (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 ) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Total Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Insolv. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Syst. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Idio. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta 
Ln Vega 0.0570* 0.5909* 0.0129* 0.5011* 0.0305 0.5627** 0.0003* 0.5815** 
(0.0338) (0.3017) (0.0074) (0.2820) (0.0297) (0.2280) (0.0002) (0.2646) 
Ln Delta -0.0713*** 1.6923* -0.0081** 1.9958* 0.0021 1.7770** -0.0001* 1.7196** 
(0.0157) (0.8640) (0.0035) (1.1233) (0.0136) (0.7199) (0.0001) (0.7826) 
HHI 0.1278*** -2.7240* 1.6096*** 0.0283*** -3.0358* 1.5211*** 0.0531* -2.9364** 1.6524*** 0.0005*** -2.6567* 1.5449*** 
(0.0382) (1.4450) (0.3509) (0.0100) (1.5941) (0.5140) (0.0316) (1.4716) (0.4972) (0.0002) (1.5055) (0.4867) 
Total Risk 1.2574 -0.7430 
(7.9386) (4.9371) 
Insolvency Risk -8.7950 4.4068 
(54.2238) (25.6076) 
Systemic Risk 1.7323 -0.9748 
(11.2663) (6.3526) 
Idiosyncratic Risk -329.3183 191.5044 
(2099.1768) (1263.9840) 
Ln Ta 0.0187 -6.7419 3.9839*** 0.0147 -8.8799 4.4493*** 0.5196*** -8.2685 4.6530 0.0014* -7.0039* 4.0729*** 
(0.1155) (5.1425) (1.3072) (0.0284) (6.0129) (0.8455) (0.1011) (6.5496) (3.2529) (0.0008) (3.9916) (0.8080) 
Leverage -0.5860*** 7.4772* -4.4184* -0.3410 4.8990 -2.4547 0.3151* 6.9866 -3.9316 -0.0004 7.2633 -4.2237** 
(0.2025) (4.3656) (2.3093) (0.4559) (15.6267) (8.5270) (0.1884) (5.8221) (2.7898) (0.0014) (4.8086) (1.9820) 
Tobin Q -2.5032 50.0118 -29.5528 -2.1215 31.7769 -15.9221 1.7611 50.6857 -28.5225 -0.0022 49.6281 -28.8596 
(1.8996) (45.6720) (20.0470) (3.7205) (107.2971) (57.3795) (1.6513) (46.5247) (21.3225) (0.0114) (47.8731) (21.0505) 
Economic  Conditions 0.0041 -0.0005 -0.0026 -0.0000 
(0.0044) (0.0011) (0.0038) (0.0000) 
Market Concentration -0.8534 0.2021 -1.0505*** 0.0022 
(0.5677) (0.1378) (0.4027) (0.0035) 
HHI 0.1278*** -2.7240* 1.6096*** 0.0283*** -3.0358* 1.5211*** 0.0531* -2.9364** 1.6524*** 0.0005*** -2.6567* 1.5449*** 
(0.0382) (1.4450) (0.3509) (0.0100) (1.5941) (0.5140) (0.0316) (1.4716) (0.4972) (0.0002) (1.5055) (0.4867) 
tenure -0.9289 0.5489* -1.2132 0.6079*** -1.0664 0.6001*** -0.9969 0.5797*** 
(0.9284) (0.2832) (1.0341) (0.1886) (0.6868) (0.1789) (0.6875) (0.1538) 
Ln cash Compensation -2.0955 1.2383* -2.6623 1.3340** -2.2716** 1.2783** -2.3493** 1.3661** 
(1.6242) (0.6407) (1.8643) (0.5823) (0.9846) (0.5317) (0.9443) (0.6774) 
Nº  observations 2323 2323 2323 2324 2324 2324 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Nª Banks 444 444 444 446 446 446 443 443 443 443 443 443 
F-stat first stage  
Risk 11.60*** 11.60*** 1.98 1.98 2.58* 2.58* 0.48 0.48 
Vega 14.62*** 12.53*** 14.42*** 12.29*** 14.60*** 12.54*** 14.60*** 12.54*** 
Delta 42.25*** 2.78* 41.37*** 2.45* 42.23*** 2.77* 42.23*** 2.77**        
Endogeneity test-GMM (est) 55.0150 20.3168 3.0593 7.3449 21.5423 0.6957 1.0638 21.6129 1.2619 7.9745 21.6778 0.9914 
Underidentification test 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM  stat 9.0442 3.6554 6.4627 8.9816 2.3770 4.1916 9.0554 4.5298 4.6836 9.0554 0.9915 0.9715 
Underidentification-P value 0.0026 0.0559 0.0110 0.0027 0.1231 0.0406 0.0026 0.0333 0.0305 0.0026 0.3194 0.3243 
Weak identification test  
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat 3.653 1.697 3.133 3.643 1.087 1.690 3.657 2.479 2.594 3.657 0.483 0.476 
F- second stage 21.4404 5.4557 101.9759 2.6150 3.8598 101.9432 47.9193 4.8117 98.8807 2.7583 5.2558 101.6809 
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Table 7: Second stage regression estimates of equations (1), (2) and (3) on SH1 to 3 shareholdings (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 ) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Total Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Insolv. Risk 
Risk 
Ln Vega Ln Delta Syst. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Idio. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta 
Ln Vega 0.0572*  0.6062** 0.0126*  0.4973* 0.0303  0.5680** 0.0003*  0.5926** 
(0.0335)  (0.3020) (0.0072)  (0.2709) (0.0295)  (0.2268) (0.0002)  (0.2616) 
Ln Delta -0.0715*** 1.6497**  -0.0081** 2.0108*  0.0021 1.7606**  -0.0001* 1.6874**  
(0.0157) (0.8218)  (0.0034) (1.0953)  (0.0135) (0.7030)  (0.0001) (0.7450)  
SH1to3 0.2726*** -5.6726** 3.4387*** 0.0690*** -6.3794** 3.1726*** 0.1196* -6.2688** 3.5606*** 0.0011*** -5.4925* 3.2550*** 
(0.0799) (2.7840) (0.6706) (0.0251) (3.1305) (1.1745) (0.0675) (2.9685) (1.0205) (0.0004) (3.1209) (0.9432) 
Total Risk  1.6862 -1.0221          
 (7.7038) (5.0020)          
Insolvency Risk     -11.4200 5.6794       
    (53.5578) (24.7611)       
Systemic Risk        2.3695 -1.3458    
       (11.3654) (6.4698)    
Idiosyncratic Risk           -437.3926 259.2106 
          (2056.6383) (1273.9102) 
Ln Ta 0.0184 -6.4376 3.9024*** 0.0137 -8.9935 4.4727*** 0.5188*** -8.4954 4.8253 0.0014* -6.7959* 4.0274*** 
(0.1147) (4.9147) (1.3242) (0.0279) (5.897) (0.8464) (0.1002) (6.5931) (3.3069) (0.0007) (3.8013) (0.8118) 
Leverage -0.5783*** 7.2337* -4.3850* -0.3413 3.9628 -1.9708 0.3178* 6.5271 -3.7073 -0.0004 6.9547 -4.1215** 
(0.2005) (4.1598) (2.3250) (0.4555) (15.8967) (8.4194) (0.1869) (5.7320) (2.8302) (0.0014) (4.5956) (2.0043) 
Tobin Q -2.4515 47.4078 -28.7381 -2.1493 25.7766 -12.8193 1.7659 47.9995 -27.2631 -0.0020 46.9883 -27.8465 
(1.8869) (43.5221) (20.1076) (3.7296) (110.9423) (57.8251) (1.6364) (45.4571) (21.4134) (0.0114) (45.8901) (21.1603) 
Economic  Conditions 0.0041   -0.0005   -0.0026   -0.0000   
(0.0044)   (0.0010)   (0.0038)   (0.0000)   
Market Concentration -0.8271   0.2128   -1.0360***   0.0023   
(0.5664)   (0.1374)   (0.4010)   (0.0036)   
tenure  -0.8765 0.5313*  -1.2258 0.6096***  -1.0589 0.6014***  -0.9684 0.5739*** 
 (0.8860) (0.2865)  (1.0128) (0.1845)  (0.6759) (0.1796)  (0.6566) (0.1533) 
Ln cash Compensation  -2.0062 1.2161*  -2.7101 1.3478**  -2.2378** 1.2710**  -2.3463** 1.3905** 
 (1.5594) (0.6404)  (1.8172) (0.5795)  (0.9685) (0.5339)  (0.9260) (0.6793) 
Nº  observations 2323 2323 2323 2324 2324 2324 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Nª Banks 444 444 444 446 446 446 443 443 443 443 443 443 
F-stat first stage  
Risk  11.69*** 11.69***  2.03 2.03  2.51* 2.51*  0.49 0.49 
Vega 14.71***  12.83 *** 14.50***  12.60*** 14.69***  12.84*** 14.69***  12.84*** 
Delta 41.98*** 2.91*  41.08*** 2.56*  41.96*** 2.91*  41.96*** 2.91*         
Endogeneity test-GMM (est) 55.0067 20.7287 3.0797 7.4305 22.0054 0.7534 1.0597 22.0456 1.3574 8.0696 22.1204 1.0609 
Underidentification test 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM  stat 9.2030 3.8626 6.4214 9.1486 2.5696 4.501 9.2143 4.4281 4.5980 9.2143 0.9938 0.9751 
Underidentification-P value 0.0024 0.0494 0.0113 0.0025 0.1089 0.0339 0.0024 0.0354 0.0320 0.0024 0.3188 0.3234 
Weak identification test  
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat 3.717 1.802 3.109 3.711 2.408 2.530 3.720 2.479 2.594 3.720 0.485 0.478 
F- second stage 21.5055 5.7555 102.5112 2.6752 3.7907 101.7675 48.1792 4.8593 97.9937 2.6681 5.4308 101.5761 
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Table 8: Types of shareholders (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 ) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Total Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Insolv. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Syst. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Idio. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta 
Ln Vega 0.0605* 0.7619** 0.0147* 0.5058* 0.0339 0.6575*** 0.0003* 0.7319** 
(0.0339) (0.3320) (0.0082) (0.2829) (0.0300) (0.2393) (0.0002) (0.2909) 
Ln Delta -0.0723*** 1.3125** -0.0091** 1.9772* 0.0002 1.5210*** -0.0001* 1.3662** 
(0.0160) (0.5719) (0.0041) (1.1061) (0.0139) (0.5535) (0.0001) (0.5431) 
Sh1 family 0.1814*** -2.9390** 2.2393*** 0.0328*** -3.7107* 1.8768*** 0.0611 -3.5722** 2.3486*** 0.0005* -2.8474** 2.0841*** 
(0.0596) (1.2222) (0.5949) (0.0124) (1.9727) (0.6469) (0.0505) (1.5095) (0.7210) (0.0003) (1.3394) (0.5590) 
Sh1 Institution 0.1202** -2.0235* 1.5417*** 0.0235** -2.6587* 1.3447** 0.0660* -2.8311* 1.8614** 0.0004* -1.8223 1.3339* 
(0.0508) (1.1907) (0.5748) (0.0103) (1.5108) (0.6518) (0.0373) (1.6122) (0.8474) (0.0002) (1.4233) (0.7095) 
Sh1 Corporation 0.1336** -1.9762** 1.5057** 0.0555* -1.1953 0.6045 0.0566 -2.4089* 1.5838** 0.0008*** -1.3174 0.9643 
(0.0558) (0.9653) (0.6380) (0.0289) (2.5018) (1.4330) (0.0436) (1.2806) (0.7260) (0.0003) (1.7266) (1.0559) 
Sh1 Bank -0.0473 1.4909 -1.1359 -0.0020 2.8506 -1.4418* -0.1204** 2.6852 -1.7654 -0.0003 1.5641 -1.1448 
(0.0641) (1.3168) (0.7983) (0.0127) (2.4361) (0.8165) (0.0579) (1.9899) (1.2458) (0.0003) (1.3256) (0.8090) 
Total Risk 3.8925 -2.9657 
(6.0965) (5.5301) 
Insolvency Risk -34.6502 17.5250 
(72.9493) (30.2108) 
Systemic Risk 6.4101 -4.2146 
(11.4630) (7.6254) 
Idiosyncratic Risk -1113.5312 815.0488 
(2129.5116) (1715.1001) 
Ln Ta 0.0332 -4.6636 3.5532*** 0.0251 -9.4418 4.7754*** 0.5234*** -9.6025 6.3135* 0.0015* -5.2622* 3.8517*** 
(0.1192) (3.5449) (1.3773) (0.0315) (6.2540) (0.8531) (0.1043) (6.3246) (3.8090) (0.0008) (2.9711) (0.9605) 
Leverage -0.4954** 4.9875 -3.8000 -0.3284 -5.9566 3.0127 0.3413* 2.6347 -1.7323 -0.0002 4.2149 -3.0851 
(0.2089) (3.2418) (2.4982) (0.4516) (25.7906) (12.1068) (0.1862) (5.3848) (3.3893) (0.0013) (3.7461) (2.3636) 
Tobin Q -1.7155 22.4859 -17.1321 -2.1032 -53.5897 27.1040 2.0948 16.9739 -11.1600 -0.0009 18.6750 -13.6692 
(2.0104) (32.7364) (22.6020) (3.7627) (195.6497) (91.4783) (1.6934) (40.5659) (25.4302) (0.0117) (38.0225) (25.5917) 
Economic  Conditions 0.0043 -0.0006 -0.0029 -0.0000 
(0.0044) (0.0011) (0.0038) (0.0000) 
Market Concentration -0.6609 0.2033 -0.9558** 0.0023 
(0.5697) (0.1367) (0.3938) (0.0037) 
tenure -0.5358 0.4082 -1.2463 0.6304*** -0.9310* 0.6121*** -0.7207 0.5275*** 
(0.6404) (0.3194) (1.0587) (0.1955) (0.5596) (0.1871) (0.4860) (0.1615) 
Ln cash Compensation -1.4127 1.0763* -3.0152 1.5250** -1.8463** 1.2139** -2.2306*** 1.6327** 
(1.1647) (0.6468) (2.2410) (0.6675) (0.8574) (0.5654) (0.8229) (0.8220) 
Nº  observations 2323 2323 2323 2324 2324 2324 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Nª Banks 444 444 444 446 446 446 443 443 443 443 443 443 
F-stat first stage  
Risk 11.99*** 11.99*** 2.17 2.17 2.26* 2.26* 0.43 0.43 
Vega 14.76*** 13.08 *** 14.60*** 12.86*** 14.74*** 13.09*** 14.74*** 13.09*** 
Delta 44.14*** 4.11** 43.15*** 3.75** 44.12*** 4.11** 44.12*** 4.11**        
Endogeneity test-GMM (est) 54.0985 20.6838 4.2895 6.5889 21.9797 1.8916 1.4077 22.0101 2.7201 9.0454 22.1232 2.3185 
Underidentification test 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM  stat 9.1364 5.7563 6.1091 9.0103 1.8431 4.0149 9.1477 3.9880 4.1302 9.1477 0.8703 0.8411 
Underidentification-P value 0.0025 0.0164 0.0134 0.0027 0.1746 0.0451 0.0025 0.0458 0.0421 0.0025 0.3509 0.3591 
Weak identification test  
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat 3.712 2.614 2.912 3.681 0.844 1.613 3.716 2.164 2.287 3.716 0.426 0.412 
F- second stage 15.4446 6.8776 69.8033 1.8239 2.7432 62.7099 39.2435 4.5326 62.2740 1.9211 5.5445 60.6208 
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Table 9: total shareholdings by investor type (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 ) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Total Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Insolv. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Syst. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta Idio. Risk Ln Vega Ln Delta 
Ln Vega 0.0833* 0.6598** 0.0176* 0.4920* 0.0476 0.5948*** 0.0004* 0.6466** 
(0.0504) (0.2997) (0.0099) (0.2986) (0.0358) (0.2208) (0.0002) (0.2731) 
Ln Delta -0.0976*** 1.5155** -0.0125** 2.0325* -0.0151 1.6812*** -0.0002* 1.5466** 
(0.0292) (0.6883) (0.0058) (1.2336) (0.0201) (0.6241) (0.0001) (0.6534) 
Family shareholdings 0.2574*** -3.6650** 2.4184*** 0.0374** -4.5283* 2.2279*** 0.1268** -4.2345** 2.5187*** 0.0009** -3.5609** 2.3024*** 
(0.0929) (1.4276) (0.3338) (0.0174) (2.4531) (0.3282) (0.0626) (1.6610) (0.5499) (0.0004) (1.6209) (0.3196) 
Corporate shareholdings -0.0237 0.5110 -0.3372** 0.0020 0.8892 -0.4375* -0.0074 0.6451 -0.3837** 0.0000 0.6043* -0.3907** 
(0.0183) (0.4075) (0.1700) (0.0067) (0.9214) (0.2413) (0.0116) (0.3960) (0.1707) (0.0001) (0.3433) (0.1837) 
Insitutional shareholdings 0.0862** -1.7676 1.1664*** 0.0159* -2.4799 1.2201*** 0.0941*** -2.4102 1.4336** 0.0006*** -1.6154 1.0445 
(0.0394) (1.1598) (0.3105) (0.0086) (1.6097) (0.2393) (0.0268) (1.4084) (0.6090) (0.0002) (1.5116) (0.6359) 
Bank shareholdings -0.0305 0.5504* -0.3632** -0.0061 0.7647* -0.3762** -0.0207 0.6521** -0.3879** -0.0001 0.5997** -0.3877** 
(0.0231) (0.3102) (0.1470) (0.0055) (0.4334) (0.1498) (0.0158) (0.2986) (0.1579) (0.0001) (0.2622) (0.1573) 
Total Risk 2.5856 -1.7061 
(6.7950) (4.9946) 
Insolvency Risk -22.1205 10.8833 
(69.1107) (29.1710) 
Systemic Risk 3.7894 -2.2540 
(10.8812) (6.4585) 
Idiosyncratic Risk -739.3553 478.0499 
(2120.5700) (1478.5109) 
Ln Ta 0.0290 -3.6718 2.4228** 0.0194 -6.4812 3.1888*** 0.5111*** -6.3136 3.7554 0.0014 -4.1367* 2.6747*** 
(0.1520) (3.1396) (1.1970) (0.0335) (5.1042) (0.8880) (0.1066) (5.2052) (2.8276) (0.0009) (2.2835) (0.6664) 
Leverage -0.5359** 5.2091 -3.4372 -0.3294 -1.5554 0.7652 0.2873 4.0078 -2.3838 -0.0005 4.6800 -3.0260 
(0.2444) (3.3916) (2.1354) (0.4582) (21.2515) (10.1634) (0.1904) (5.0333) (2.8005) (0.0014) (3.8557) (2.0072) 
Tobin Q -1.7232 24.2469 -15.9993 -1.9237 -21.3880 10.5229 1.9565 21.8176 -12.9772 -0.0004 22.7307 -14.6971 
(2.3013) (32.8281) (18.9768) (3.7370) (148.7158) (69.5920) (1.7215) (38.0604) (21.1645) (0.0126) (36.0100) (20.5834) 
Economic  Conditions 0.0029 -0.0007 -0.0038 -0.0000 
(0.0059) (0.0013) (0.0043) (0.0000) 
Market Concentration -0.7987 0.1865 -1.0609** 0.0019 
(0.7172) (0.1507) (0.4283) (0.0039) 
tenure -0.5678 0.3747 -1.0453 0.5143** -0.8067 0.4799*** -0.6949 0.4493*** 
(0.6759) (0.2863) (1.0254) (0.2036) (0.5345) (0.1629) (0.4914) (0.1495) 
Ln cash Compensation -1.1066 0.7302 -2.0166 0.9922 -1.2931 0.7692 -1.6499* 1.0668 
(1.1452) (0.6207) (1.8890) (0.6248) (0.9065) (0.5733) (0.9193) (0.7977) 
Nº  observations 2323 2323 2323 2324 2324 2324 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Nª Banks 444 444 444 446 446 446 443 443 443 443 443 443 
F-stat first stage  
Risk 12.36*** 12.36*** 2.10 2.10 2.64* 2.64* 0.44 0.44 
Vega 14.81*** 13.61 *** 14.55*** 13.34*** 14.80*** 13.61*** 14.80*** 13.61*** 
Delta 29.68*** 3.43** 29.21*** 3.14** 29.65*** 3.43** 29.65*** 3.43**        
Endogeneity test-GMM 56.6517 21.7153 3.2897 8.4846 23.1623 1.1509 1.8835 23.2956 1.7278 10.4573 23.3725 1.4398 
Underidentification test 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM  stat 6.2714 4.9795 6.6059 6.3010 1.6261 3.4571 6.2768 4.5050 4.7275 6.2768 0.8474 0.8142 
Underidentification-P value 0.0123 0.0256 0.0102 0.0121 0.2022 0.0630 0.0122 0.0338 0.0297 0.0122 0.3573 0.3669 
Weak identification test  
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat 2.621 2.215 3.254 2.638 0.754 1.407 2.623 2.480 2.650 2.623 0.412 0.400 
F- second stage 10.4315 5.2593 87.0824 1.4827 2.7876 81.6071 35.6487 4.1027 81.8629 2.1160 4.8258 84.4455 
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Table 10: Direct and indirect effect of Delta and Vega on bank risk (for all models) 
Table 5: Sh1 TR InsR SR IdR Table 5: Sh1 TR InsR SR IdR 
Direct Effect of Vega on risk 0.0616* 0.0138* 0.0328 0.0003* Direct Effect of Delta on risk -0.0718*** -0.0082** 0.0017 -0.0001* 
Indirect Effect of Vega on risk via Delta  -0.0484*** -0.0054** 0.0012 -0.0001* Indirect Effect of Delta on risk via Vega 0.0913* 0.0209* 0.0481 0.0004* 
Total Effect Vega on risk 0.0132 0.0084 0.0340 0.0002 Total Effect Delta on risk 0.0195 0.0127 0.0498 0.0003 
Table 6: HHI TR InsR SR IdR Table 6: HHI TR InsR SR IdR 
Direct Effect Vega 0.0570* 0.0129* 0.0305 0.0003* Direct Effect of Delta on risk -0.0713*** -0.0081** 0.0021 -0.0001* 
Indirect Effect of Vega via Delta -0.0421*** -0.0041** 0.0012 -0.0001* Indirect Effect of Delta on risk via Vega 0.0965* 0.0257* 0.0542 0.0005* 
Total Effect Vega 0.0149 0.0088 0.0317 0.0002 Total Effect Delta on risk 0.0252 0.0176 0.0563 0.0004 
Table 7: sh1to3  TR InsR SR IdR Table 7: sh1to3 TR InsR SR IdR 
Direct Effect Vega 0.0572* 0.0126* 0.0303 0.0003* Direct Effect of Delta on risk -0.0715*** -0.0081** 0.0021 -0.0001* 
Indirect Effect via Delta -0.0433*** -0.0040** 0.0012 -0.0001* Indirect Effect of Delta on risk via Vega 0.0944* 0.0253* 0.0533 0.0005* 
Total Effect Vega 0.0139 0.0086 0.0315 0.0002 Total Effect Delta on risk 0.0229 0.0172 0.0554 0.0004 
Table 8: Types of shareholders TR InsR SR IdR Table 8: Types of shareholders TR InsR SR IdR 
Direct Effect Vega 0.0605* 0.0147* 0.0339 0.0003* Direct Effect of Delta on risk -0.0723*** -0.0091** 0.0002 -0.0001* 
Indirect Effect of Vega via Delta -0.0551*** -0.0046** 0.0001 -0.0001* Indirect Effect of Delta on risk via Vega 0.0794* 0.0291* 0.0516 0.0004* 
Total Effect Vega 0.0054 0.0101 0.0340 0.0002 Total Effect Delta on risk 0.0071 0.0200 0.0518 0.0003 
Table 9: Total shareholdings by type  TR InsR SR IdR Table 9: Total shareholdings by type TR InsR SR IdR 
Direct Effect Vega 0.0833* 0.0176* 0.0476 0.0004* Direct Effect of Delta on risk -0.0976*** -0.0125** -0.0151 -0.0002* 
Indirect Effect of Vega via Delta -0.0644*** -0.0062** -0.0090 -0.0001* Indirect Effect of Delta on risk via Vega 0.1262* 0.0358* 0.0800 0.0006* 
Total Effect Vega 0.0189 0.0115 0.0386 0.0003 Total Effect Delta on risk 0.0286 0.0233 0.0649 0.0004 
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Table 11: Calculation of direct, indirect and total effect of ownership concentration on bank risk (tables 5-7) 
SH1 TOTAL RISK VEGA DELTA 
INSOLVENCY 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
Direct effect 0.1194*** -1.9567* 1.3195** 0.0299*** -1.9990* 1.3168* 0.0380 -1.9266* 1.3142** 0.0004** -1.9758* 1.3405** 
Vega indirect effect -0.0022* -0.0305** -0.0005* -0.0134** -0.0009 -0.0308*** 0.0000* -0.0307*** 
Delta indirect effect -0.0948*** 1.9204** -0.0112** 1.9641** 0.0013 1.8985*** -0.0002* 1.9089*** 
Risk indirect effect -0.0089 0.0060 0.0146 -0.0096 -0.0172 0.0117 0.0217 -0.0148 
∑ indirect sign. effects -0.0970 1.9204 -0.0305 -0.0117 1.9641 -0.0134 0.0000 1.8985 -0.0308 -0.0002 1.9089 -0.0307 
∑ significant effects 0.0224 -0.0363 1.28901 0.0182 -0.0350 1.3034 0.0000 -0.02806 1.2833 0.0002 -0.0669 1.3098 
Total effect( RFcoeff) 0.0236 -0.0452 1.2950** 0.0190 -0.0204 1.2938** 0.0000 -0.0452 1.2951 0.0003 -0.0452 1.2951** 
HHI TOTAL RISK VEGA DELTA 
INSOLVENCY 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
Direct effect 0.1278*** -2.724* 1.6096*** 0.0283*** -3.0358* 1.5211*** 0.0531* -2.9364** 1.6524*** 0.0005*** -2.6567* 1.5449*** 
Vega indirect effect -0.0034* -0.0258* 0.0015* -0.0086* -0.0042 -0.0246** 0.0000* -0.0254** 
Delta indirect effect -0.1129*** 2.6639* -0.0123** 3.1526* 0.0034 2.7972** -0.0002* 2.7068** 
Risk indirect effect 0.0165 -0.0097 -0.1339 0.0671 0.0955 -0.0537 -0.0938 0.0546 
∑ indirect sign. effects -0.1164 2.6639 -0.0258 -0.0107 3.1526 -0.0086 0.0000 2.7972 -0.0246 -0.0001 2.7068 -0.0254 
∑ significant effects 0.0114 -0.0601 1.5838 0.0176 0.1168 1.5126 0.0531 -0.1392 1.6278 0.0004 0.0501 1.5195 
Total effect( RFcoeff) 0.0131 -0.0437 1.5741 0.0153 -0.0170 1.5796 0.0551 -0.0437 1.5741 0.0003 -0.0437 1.5741 
SH1 to 3 TOTAL RISK VEGA DELTA 
INSOLVENCY 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
Direct effect 0.2726*** -5.6726** 3.4387*** 0.0690*** -6.3794** 3.1726*** 0.1196* -6.2688** 3.5607*** 0.0011*** -5.4925 3.2552*** 
Vega indirect effect -0.0192* -0.1791** 0.0026** -0.1201* -0.0174 -0.1678** 0.0000 -0.1750** 
Delta indirect effect -0.2331*** 5.3364** -0.0247** 6.5883* 0.0071 5.6951** -0.0003* 5.4584** 
Risk indirect effect 0.0408 -0.0248 -0.4504 0.2239 0.2783 -0.1581 -0.2612 0.1548 
∑ indirect sign. effects -0.2523 5.3364 -0.1791 -0.0221 6.5883 -0.1201 0.0000 5.6951 -0.1678 -0.0003 5.4584 -0.1750 
∑ significant effects 0.0203 -0.3362 3.2596 0.0469 0.2090 3.0525 0.1196 -0.5737 3.3928 0.0008 -0.0341 3.0800 
Total effect ( RFcoeff) 0.0203 -0.2954 3.2348 0.0469 -0.2414 3.2765 0.1093 -0.2954 3.2348 0.0008 -0.2954 3.2348 
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Table 12: Calculation of direct, indirect and total effect of SH1 on bank risk by type of shareholder (table 8) 
SH1*FAMILY 
TOTAL 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
INSOLVENCY 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
Direct effect 0.1814*** -2.939** 2.2393*** 0.0328*** -3.7107* 1.8768*** 0.0611 -3.5722** 2.3486*** 0.0005* -2.8474** 2.0841*** 
Vega indirect effect -0.0255* -0.25472** 0.00123* -0.1504* -0.0222 -0.2198*** -6.8239* -0.2447** 
Delta indirect effect -0.1434*** 2.5169** -0.0157** 3.7947* 0.00042 2.9168*** -0.0001* 2.6199** 
Risk indirect effect 0.08773 -0.06691 -0.3813 0.1928 0.3210 -0.2111 -0.1069 0.0783 
∑ indirect sign. effects -0.1690 2.5169 -0.2547 -0.0144 3.7947 -0.1504 0.0000 2.9168 -0.2198 -0.0002 2.6199 -0.2447 
∑ significant effects 0.0124 -0.4221 1.9846 0.0183 0.0840 1.7264 0.0000 -0.6554 2.1288 0.0002 -0.2275 1.8394 
Total effect ( RFcoeff) 0.0225 -0.3343 1.9177 0.0110 -0.2973 1.9192 0.0501 -0.3343 1.9177 0.0002 -0.3343 1.9177 
SH1*INSTITUTION 
TOTAL 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
INSOLVENCY 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
Direct effect 0.1202** -2.0235* 1.5417*** 0.0235** -2.6587* 1.3447** 0.066* -2.8311* 1.8614** 0.0004* -1.8223 1.3339* 
Vega indirect effect 0.0163* 0.2455** 0.0116* 0.1756* -0.0058 0.2118*** 0.0007* 0.2358** 
Delta indirect effect -0.1292*** 2.2936** -0.0138** 3.4473* 0.00041 2.6581*** -0.0001* 2.3876** 
Risk indirect effect 0.0520 -0.03965 -0.4414 0.22321 0.4951 -0.32559 -0.2431 0.17794 
∑ indirect sign. effects -0.1128 2.2936 0.2455 -0.0022 3.4473 0.1756 0.0000 2.6581 0.2118 0.0006 2.3876 0.2358 
∑ significant effects 0.0073 0.2702 1.7872 0.0213 0.7886 1.5203 0.0000 -0.1730 2.0732 0.0010 2.3876 1.5697 
Total effect ( RFcoeff) 0.0073 0.3222 1.7476 0.0213 0.3472 1.7435 0.0606 0.3221 1.7476 0.0010 0.3221 1.7476 
SH1*CORPORATION 
TOTAL 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
INSOLVENCY 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
Direct effect 0.1336** -1.9762** 1.5057** 0.0555* -1.1953 0.6045 0.0566 -2.4089* 1.5838** 0.0008*** -1.3174 0.9643 
Vega indirect effect -0.0250* -0.2278** 0 -0.1331 -0.0202 -0.1965*** 0 -0.2188 
Delta indirect effect -0.0923*** 1.5627** 0 2.3484 0.00027 1.8109*** 0 1.6266 
Risk indirect effect 0.1144 -0.08726 -1.4161 0.71631 0.2991 -0.19668 -0.60809 0.44506 
∑ indirect sign. effects -0.1174 1.5627 -0.2278 0 0 0 0.0000 1.8109 -0.1965 0.0008 0 0 
∑ significant effects 0.0162 -0.4135 1.2779 0.0555 0 0 0.0000 -0.5980 1.3873 0.0008 0 0 
Total effect ( RFcoeff) 0.0162 -0.2990 1.1906 0.0912 -0.2631 1.1877 0.0366 -0.2989 1.1906 0.0016 -0.2989 1.1906 
SH1*BANK 
TOTAL 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
INSOLVENCY 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
Direct effect -0.0473 1.4909 -1.1359 -0.002 2.8506 -1.4418* -0.1204** 2.6852 -1.7654 -0.0003 1.5641 -1.1448 
Vega indirect effect 0 0.0333 -0.0357* 0.0349* 0 0.0287 0 0.0319 
Delta indirect effect 0 1.5627 0.0128** -2.4288* 0 -1.8782 0 -1.6869 
Risk indirect effect -3.0099 -0.1322 -0.3529 0.1785 -0.7634 0.5019 0.1665 -0.1219 
∑ indirect sign. effects 0 0.0000 0 0.0229 -2.4288 0.0349 0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 
∑ significant effects 0 0.0000 0 0.0229 -2.4288 -1.4069 -0.1204 0 0 0 0 0 
Total effect ( RFcoeff) -0.0497 0.0437 -1.2349 -0.0249 0.0689 -1.2284 -0.1840 0.0436 -1.2348 -0.0008 0.0436 -1.2348 
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Table 13: Calculation of direct, indirect and total effect of total shareholdings by type on bank risk (tables 9) 
TOTAL FAMILY 
TOTAL 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
INSOLVENCY 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
Direct effect 0.2574*** -3.665** 2.4184*** 0.0374** -3.665* 2.2279*** 0.1268** -4.2345** 2.5157*** 0.0009** -3.5609** 2.3024*** 
Vega indirect effect -0.0478* -0.3554** 0.00732* -0.2567* -0.0383 -0.3204*** -0.0001* -0.3483** 
Delta indirect effect -0.2012*** 3.0914** -0.0246** 4.0814* -0.0331 3.4294*** -0.0003* 3.1548** 
Risk indirect effect 0.0349 -0.0231 -0.9380 0.0343 0.2665 -0.1555 -0.1326 0.0857 
∑ indirect sign. effects -0.2490 3.0914 -0.3554 -0.0173 4.0814 -0.2567 0.0000 3.4294 -0.3204 -0.0004 3.1548 -0.3483 
∑ significant effects 0.0083 -0.5737 2.0630 0.0201 0.4164 1.9712 0.1268 -0.8051 2.1953 0.0005 -0.4061 1.9541 
Total effect ( RFcoeff) 0.0083 -0.5387 2.0398 0.0201 -0.5217 2.0056 0.0553 -0.5386 2.0398 0.0003 -0.5386 2.0398 
TOTAL 
INSTITUTIONAL 
TOTAL 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
INSOLVENCY 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
Direct effect 0.0862** -1.7676* 1.1664*** 0.0159* -2.4799* 1.2201*** 0.0941*** -2.4102* 1.4336** 0.0006*** -1.6154 1.0445 
Vega indirect effect 0.18259* 0.2375** 0.05193* 0.1825* 0.1157 0.2141*** 0 0.2328 
Delta indirect effect -0.1369*** 2.1921** -0.0175** 2.9508* -0.0248 2.4317*** 0 2.2370 
Risk indirect effect -0.06445 0.04249 -0.0999 0.04738 0.33848 -0.20131 -0.2616 0.1691 
∑ indirect sign. effects 0.0456 2.1921 0.2375 0.0344 2.9508 0.1825 0.0000 2.4317 0.2141 0 0 0 
∑ significant effects 0.1318 2.1920 1.4039 0.0503 2.9508 1.4026 0.0941 2.4317 1.6477 0 0 0 
Total effect ( RFcoeff) 0.1318 0.3600 1.4464 0.0503 0.3710 1.4500 0.1850 0.3600 1.4464 0.0014 0.3600 1.4464 
TOTAL 
CORPORATIONS 
TOTAL 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
INSOLVENCY 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
Direct effect -0.0237 0.511 -0.3372** 0.002 0.8892 -0.4375* -0.0074 0.6451 -0.3837** 0 0.6043* -0.3907** 
Vega indirect effect -0.0611* -0.1361** -0.0174* -0.0984* -0.0387 -0.1227*** -0.0001* -0.1334** 
Delta indirect effect 0.0462*** -0.7336** 0.0067** -0.9902* 0.0076 -0.8138*** 0.0001* -0.7486** 
Risk indirect effect 0.0163 -0.0108 -0.0990 0.0493 -0.0375 0.02233 -0.0619 0.0400 
∑ indirect sign. effects -0.0149 -0.7336 -0.1361 -0.0107 -0.9902 -0.0984 0.0000 -0.8138 -0.1227 0.0000 -0.7486 -0.1334 
∑ significant effects -0.0149 -0.7336 -0.4733 -0.0107 -0.9902 -0.5359 0.0000 -0.8138 -0.5064 0.0000 -0.1443 -0.5241 
Total effect ( RFcoeff) -0.0386 -0.2063 -0.4841 -0.0087 -0.2000 -0.4866 -0.0384 -0.2063 -0.4840 0.0000 -0.2063 -0.4840 
TOTAL BANKS 
TOTAL 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
INSOLVENCY 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
RISK VEGA DELTA 
Direct effect -0.0305 0.5504* -0.3632** -0.0061 0.7647* -0.3762** -0.0207 0.6521** -0.3879** -0.0001 0.5997** -0.3877** 
Vega indirect effect 0.01225* 0.1139** 0.00321* 0.0843* 0.00972 0.1024*** 0.00007* 0.1113** 
Delta indirect effect 0.02432*** -0.4033** 0.00364** -0.5823* 0.00431 -0.4477*** 0.00005* -0.4119** 
Risk indirect effect 0.02559 -0.01686 -0.0111 0.0058 -0.0323 0.01922 -0.0157 0.0101 
∑ indirect sign. effects 0.0366 -0.4033 0.1139 0.0069 -0.5823 0.0843 0.0000 -0.4477 0.1024 0.000012 -0.4119 0.1113 
∑ significant effects 0.0366 0.1471 -0.2493 0.0069 0.1824 -0.2919 0.0000 0.2044 -0.2855 0.0001 0.1878 -0.2764 
Total effect ( RFcoeff) 0.0061 0.1727 -0.2661 0.0008 0.1714 -0.2861 -0.0066 0.1721 -0.2663 0.0000 0.1721 -0.2663 
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Appendix 1: Measures of incentives provided by company’s stock and executive stock options 
Estimates of Delta and Vega are based on Black-Scholes option pricing formula as extended by 
Merton (1973) to account for a dividend flow. 
Stock option Delta is the partial derivative of an option value with respect to the stock price. Stock option 
Vega is the partial derivative of an option price with respect to the standard deviation of a stock return. The 
formulas are given as follows: 
 
where N(Z) is the cumulative probability distribution function for the normal distribution, N’(Z) is the 
density function for the normal distribution, S is the price of the underlying stock, K is the option strike 
(exercise) price,σ  is expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option, r is the risk-free interest rate, T 
is time to maturity of the option in years, d is the natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over the life of 
the option. 
Previously, the usual method (the full information method) used by scholars to estimate the 
sensitivities to stock price and volatility of the option portfolio required hand-collection of some of the 
necessary information from proxy statements. Since a typical executive stock option has a ten year term, the 
procedure required analyzing every single statement filed over a ten year period. The alternative method 
proposed by Core and Guay (2002) allows for estimating Delta and Vega using only the information from 
the latest proxy (The one year approximation method). It relies on the inputs disclosed in the compensation 
table reporting year-end option exercises as well as quantity and intrinsic values of vested and unvested 
grants. The reported securities are in-the-money and by definition their intrinsic values are greater than zero. 
The method treats recently granted, vested and unvested options as three separate grants.  The Delta and 
Vega of recently granted option are computed directly because the proxy statement discloses all the inputs 
necessary for the Black-Scholes model. The proxy statement discloses separate information on unexercisable 
and exercisable previously-granted options, which are treated as to single grants. For each grant the exercise 
price and the time to maturity have to be estimated.  The exercise price for the vested and unvested grants is 
estimated as follows: 
( )
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Where V and N denote the intrinsic value and number of stock options respectively. Because the value and 
sensitivities of newly granted options are computed separately as described above, the number and fiscal year-
end intrinsic value of new options are deducted from the number and realizable value of unvested options. 
Option maturities are set in the following way. If stock options are granted in the current fiscal year, the time 
to maturity of unvested options is equal to the time to maturity of the current grants minus one year. For 
vested options, the time to maturity is equal to the maturity of the unvested grants minus three years. If there 
is no recent option award, the time to maturity for unvested and vested grants is set to nine and six years, 
respectively. 
An advantage of using SNL Financial Database to estimate Delta and Vega is that for most option 
granted it provides complete information for recently granted, vested and unvested options. From the table 
“Outstanding Equity Awards at FYE” we were able to manually collect for the period 2000-2007 the total 
number of both exercisable and non-exercisable stock options along with the exercise price and option 
expiration date at fiscal year end.  Therefore we were able to compute Delta and Vega using the full 
information method for 90% of the options grants in our sample, for the remaining 10% for which we 
didn’t have complete information for vested and unvested options we follow the one year approximation 
method to estimate the missing data (i.e., exercise prices and/or the time to maturity).   
Other information necessary to calculate Deltas and Vegas are readily available in Bloomberg Database. The 
parameters are calculated as follows. Annualized stock return volatility is estimated over the period of 60 
months. The dividend yield is the average yield measured over a three-year period. The risk-free interest rate 
is the yield on US Treasury Bonds at the end of the fiscal year with maturity comparable to that of an 
executive stock option. We follow Mazur (2011) and Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2009) and calculate stock 
option sensitivities as follows: 
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Appendix 2: computation of indirect and total effects. 
To analyze how ownership structure affects bank risk, Vega and Delta on the one hand, and how 
Vega and Delta affects bank risk on the other hand, we decompose the total effect of each independent 
variable into a direct effect and into an indirect effect. The direct effect of ownership structure on bank risk 
(Vega or Delta) is given by the partial derivative of risk (Vega or Delta) with respect to ownership structure. 
Similarly the direct effect of Vega (Delta) on bank risk is given by the partial derivative of risk with respect to 
Vega (Delta). That is, direct effects are given by the structural coefficient of each independent variable in the 
equation of interest. However, to take into account the indirect effect precipitated by a change in ownership 
structure (Delta or Vega), which feedback through the system to further affect risk in eq. (1), Vega en in 
eq.(2) or Delta in eq.(3),  the total differential of each equation in the system is required. The resulting linear 
system of total derivatives must then be solved simultaneously to find the total effect for each variable (the 
sum of the direct and indirect effects after the change has worked its way through the system). This is because 
any secondary, or feedback, effects that arise from the initial perturbation (in ownership structure, Delta or 
Vega) cause changes in the endogenous variables of the system. The total effect (which refers to the change in 
the dependent variable attributable to changes in the independent variable after all implied changes have 
been considered) is given by the coefficient of the independent variable in the reduced form equation of the 
dependent variable of interest (Ford and Jackson, 2010). 
In what follows we specify the linear system of total derivatives from which we derive the indirect 
effect of ownership structure on risk, Vega, and Delta as well as the indirect effect of Vega and Delta on bank 
risk.  
 
Indirect effect of ownership structure on bank risk, Vega and Delta. 
The total effect of ownership structure on risk, Vega and Delta is given by the total derivative of each 
equation in our systems with respect to the ownership structure variable which leads to the following system 
of total derivatives: 
1 2 5
1 2 5
1 2 5
( 2.1)
( 2.2)
( 2.3)
t t t
t t t
t t t
t t t
t t t
t t t
dRisk dVega dDelta A
dOS dOS dOS
dVega dRisk dDelta A
dOS dOS dOS
dDelta dRisk dVega A
dOS dOS dOS
β β β
γ γ γ
θ θ θ
= + +
= + +
= + +
 
Where t
t
dRisk
dOS
; t
t
dVega
dOS
; t
t
dDelta
dOS
 represents the total effect of  a change in the ownership structure variable 
on risk, Vega and Delta, respectively, after all implied changes have occurred. This total effect is given by the 
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coefficient of the ownership structure variable in the reduced form equation of risk, Vega and Delta, 
respectively (Ford and Jackson, 2010).  
From equations A2.1; A2.2 and A2.3 we obtain that: 
The direct effect of the ownership variables on risk, Vega and Delta are given by  
5β , 5γ   and 5θ , respectively. 
The indirect effect of the ownership variables on risk via Vega and Delta is given by: 
1
ln t
t
d Vega
dOS
β , 2 t
t
dDelta
dOS
β  respectively. 
The indirect effect of the ownership variables on Vega, via risk and Delta is given by: 
1
t
t
dRisk
dOS
γ , 2 t
t
dDelta
dOS
γ , respectively 
The indirect effect of ownership structure on Delta, via risk and Vega is given by: 
1
t
t
dRisk
dOS
θ , 2 t
t
dVega
dOS
θ , respectively 
Direct effects are considered to be significant when the structural coefficients are significant at the 5% 
level (our findings are robust to using 1% or 10% significant level), i.e., the direct effects of the ownership 
variables on risk, Vega and Delta are significant when   
5β , 5γ   and 5θ ,  respectively, are significant. 
Similarly, indirect effects of a change in ownership structure on a dependent variable via any of the 
endogenous explanatory variables in the equation of interest, are  considered to be significant when the 
direct effect of the endogenous explanatory  variable (through which the indirect effects works)  in the 
equation of interest is significant. That is: 
• The indirect effect of ownership structure on bank risk via Vega (Delta) is considered to be significant 
when 1β  ( 2β ) is significant  in eq. (1)  
• The indirect effect of ownership structure on Vega via risk (Delta)  is considered to be significant 
when 1γ ( 2γ ) is significant  in eq. (2)  
• The indirect effect of ownership structure on Delta via risk (Vega)  is considered to be significant 
when 1θ ( 2θ ) is significant in eq. (3)  
To add robustness to our results we compute the indirect effect of ownership structure on risk, via Vega 
and Delta, considering only those significant direct and indirect effects of ownership structure on Vega and 
Delta. That is, to compute the indirect effect of ownership structure on bank risk we proceed as follows: 
First, we decompose the total effect of ownership structure on Vega and Delta into their direct and indirect 
effect. Second, we compute the significant total effect of ownership structure on Vega and Delta as the sum 
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of those significant direct and indirect effects. Third, we compute the indirect effect of ownership structure 
on bank risk, via Vega and Delta considering the significant total effects of ownership structure on Vega and 
Delta, respectively 
 
Indirect effect of Vega on Bank risk 
The total effect of Vega on bank risk is given by the total derivative of risk with respect to Vega: 
1 2
t t
t t
dRisk dDelta
dVega dVega
β β= +
 
, where 
1β  and 2 t
t
dDelta
dVega
β  
represent the direct and indirect effect (via Delta) of Vega on bank risk, respectively. 
And where 
1 2
t t
t t
dDelta dRisk
dVega dVega
θ θ= +  
represents the total effect of Vega on Delta. To compute the total effect of Vega on Delta, we consider those 
direct and indirect effects of Vega on Delta that are significant. The direct effect of Vega on Delta is given by 
2θ , therefore the direct effect is significant if 2θ is significant. 
 In turn the indirect effects of Vega on Delta via risk ( 1
t
t
dRisk
dVega
θ ) is significant when the direct effect 
of risk (endogenous variable through which the indirect effects works) on Delta ( 1θ ) is significant. Our 
results in table 7-11 show that for all our specifications risk does not has a significant effect on Delta. Thus, 
the total effect of a change in Vega on Delta is given by the direct effect of Vega on Delta ( 2θ ). This finding 
implies that the total effect of Vega on bank risk can be computed as:  
1 2 2
t
t
dRisk
dVega
β β θ= +  
 , where 2 2β θ  represents the indirect effect of Vega on risk, via Delta.  
 
Indirect effect of Delta on Bank risk 
The total effect of Delta on bank risk is given by the total derivative of risk with respect to Delta: 
1 2
t t
t t
dRisk dVega
dDelta dDelta
β β= +
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, where 
1 2;
t
t
dVega
dDelta
β β  
represent the direct and indirect effect (via Vega) of Delta on bank risk, respectively. And where 
1 2
t t
t t
dVega dRisk
dDelta dDelta
γ γ= +  
represents the total effect of Delta on Vega. 
To compute the total effect of Delta on Vega, we consider those direct and indirect effects of Delta 
on Vega that are significant. The direct effect of Delta on Vega is given by 2γ ,therefore the direct effect is 
significant if 2γ is significant. In turn the indirect effects of Delta on Vega via risk ( 1 t
t
dRisk
dDelta
γ ) is significant 
when the direct effect of risk (endogenous variable through which the indirect effects works)  on Vega  ( 1γ )  
is significant.  Our results in table 7-11 show that for all our specifications, risk does not have a significant 
effect on Vega. Thus, the total effect of a change in Delta on Vega is given by the direct effect ( 2γ ). This 
finding implies that the total effect of Delta on bank risk can be computed as:  
1 2 2
t
t
dRisk
dDelta
β β γ= +
 
 , where 2 2β γ  represent the indirect effect that Delta has on risk via Vega.  
Robustness tests  
We also compute the total and indirect effect of a change in the ownership structure variable on risk, 
Vega and Delta and the total and indirect effect of a change in Vega Delta on risk, by using the “Mutatis 
mutandis” procedure suggested by Ford and Jackson (2010). This procedure consists in resolving the linear 
system of total derivatives resulting from a change in a common dependent variable simultaneously to find 
the total effect for each endogenous variable.  Thus, this procedure allows obtaining estimates of the relevant 
reduced form coefficient directly from the structural coefficients without having to estimate the relevant 
reduced form coefficients (which cannot be estimated for the case of Vega and Delta). Our results hold under 
this alternative computation of the direct and indirect effect.   
 
 
 
Edicions / Issues: 
 
95/1 Productividad del trabajo, eficiencia e hipótesis de convergencia en la industria 
textil-confección europea 
Jordi López Sintas 
  
95/2 El tamaño de la empresa y la remuneración de los máximos directivos 
Pedro Ortín Ángel 
  
95/3 Multiple-Sourcing and Specific Investments 
Miguel A. García-Cestona 
  
96/1 La estructura interna de puestos y salarios en la jerarquía empresarial 
Pedro Ortín Ángel 
  
96/2 Efficient Privatization Under Incomplete Contracts 
Miguel A. García-Cestona 
Vicente Salas-Fumás 
  
96/3 Institutional Imprinting, Global Cultural Models, and Patterns of 
OrganizationalLearning: Evidence from Firms in the Middle-Range Countries 
Mauro F. Guillén (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) 
  
96/4 The relationship between firm size and innovation activity: a double decision 
approach 
Ester Martínez-Ros (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) 
José M. Labeaga (UNED & Universitat Pompeu Fabra) 
  
96/5 An Approach to Asset-Liability Risk Control Through Asset-Liability Securities 
Joan Montllor i Serrats 
María-Antonia Tarrazón Rodón 
  
97/1 Protección de los administradores ante el mercado de capitales: evidencia empírica 
en España 
Rafael Crespí i Cladera  
  
97/2 Determinants of Ownership Structure: A Panel Data Approach to the Spanish Case 
Rafael Crespí i Cladera 
  
97/3 The Spanish Law of Suspension of Payments: An Economic Analysis From  
Empirical Evidence 
Esteban van Hemmen Almazor 
  
98/1 Board Turnover and Firm Performance in Spanish Companies 
Carles Gispert i Pellicer 
  
98/2 Libre competencia frente a regulación en la distribución de medicamentos: 
teoría y evidencia empírica para el caso español 
Eva Jansson 
  
98/3 Firm’s Current Performance and Innovative Behavior Are the Main Determinants of 
Salaries in Small-Medium Enterprises 
Jordi López Sintas y Ester Martínez Ros 
  
98/4 On The Determinants of Export Internalization: An Empirical 
Comparison Between Catalan and Spanish (Non-Catalan) Exporting Firms 
Alex Rialp i Criado 
  
98/5 Modelo de previsión y análisis del equilibrio financiero en la empresa 
Antonio Amorós Mestres 
  
99/1 Avaluació dinàmica de la productivitat dels hospitals i la seva descomposició  en 
canvi tecnològic i canvi en eficiència tècnica  
Magda Solà 
  
99/2 Block Transfers: Implications for the Governance of Spanish Corporations 
Rafael Crespí, and Carles Gispert 
  
99/3 The Asymmetry of IBEX-35 Returns With TAR  Models 
M.ª Dolores Márquez, César Villazón 
  
99/4 Sources and Implications of Asymmetric Competition: An Empirical Study 
Pilar López Belbeze 
  
99/5 El  aprendizaje en los acuerdos de colaboración interempresarial 
Josep Rialp i Criado 
  
00/1 The Cost of Ownership in the Governance of Interfirm Collaborations 
Josep Rialp i Criado, i Vicente Salas Fumás 
  
00/2 Reasignación de recursos y resolución de contratos en el sistema concursal español 
Stefan van Hemmen Alamazor 
  
00/3 A Dynamic Analysis of Intrafirm Diffusion: The ATMs 
Lucio Fuentelsaz, Jaime Gómez, Yolanda Polo 
  
00/4 La Elección de los Socios: Razones para Cooperar con Centros de Investigación y 
con Proveedores y Clientes 
Cristina Bayona, Teresa García, Emilio Huerta 
  
00/5 Inefficient Banks or Inefficient Assets? 
Emili Tortosa-Ausina 
  
01/1 Collaboration Strategies and Technological Innovation: A Contractual Perspective 
of the Relationship Between Firms and Technological Centers 
Alex Rialp, Josep Rialp, Lluís Santamaria 
  
01/2 Modelo para la Identificación de Grupos Estratégicos Basado en el Análisis 
Envolvente de Datos: Aplicación al Sector Bancario Español 
Diego Prior, Jordi Surroca 
  
01/3 Seniority-Based Pay: Is It Used As a Motivation Device? 
Alberto Bayo-Moriones 
  
01/4 Calidad de Servicio en la Enseñanza Universitaria: Desarrollo y Validación de una 
Escala de Medida. 
Joan-Lluís Capelleras,  José M.ª Veciana 
  
01/5 Enfoque estructural vs.  recursos y capacidades: un estudio empírico de los 
factores clave de éxito de las agencias de viajes en España. 
Fabiola López-Marín,  José M.ª Veciana 
  
01/6 Opción de Responsabilidad Limitada y Opción de Abandonar: Una Integración para 
el Análisis del Coste de Capita.  
Neus Orgaz 
  
01/7 Un Modelo de Predicción de la Insolvencia Empresarial Aplicado al Sector Textil y 
Confección de Barcelona (1994-1997).  
Antonio Somoza López 
  
01/8 La Gestión del Conocimiento en Pequeñas Empresas de Tecnología de la 
Información: Una Investigación Exploratoria.  
Laura E. Zapata Cantú 
  
01/9 Marco Institucional Formal de Creación de Empresas en Catalunya: Oferta y 
Demanda de Servicios de Apoyo 
David Urbano y José María Veciana. 
  
02/1 Access as a Motivational Device: Implications for Human Resource Management.  
Pablo Arocena, Mikel Villanueva 
  
02/2 Efficiency and Quality in Local Government. The Case of Spanish Local Authorities 
M.T. Balaguer, D. Prior, J.M. Vela 
  
02/3 Single Period Markowitz Portfolio Selection, Performance Gauging and Duality: A 
variation on Luenberger’s Shortage Function 
Walter Briec, Kristiaan Kerstens, Jean Baptiste Lesourd 
  
02/4 Innovación tecnológica y resultado exportador: un análisis empírico aplicado al 
sector textil-confección español 
Rossano Eusebio, Àlex Rialp Criado 
  
02/5 Caracterización de las empresas que colaboran con centros tecnológicos 
Lluís Santamaria, Miguel Ángel García Cestona, Josep Rialp 
  
02/6 Restricción de crédito bancario en economías emergentes: el caso de la PYME en 
México 
Esteban van Hemmen Almazor 
  
02/7 La revelación de información obligatoria y voluntaria (activos intangibles) en las 
entidades de crédito. Factores determinantes. 
Gonzalo Rodríguez Pérez 
  
02/8 Measuring Sustained Superior Performance at the Firm Level 
Emili Grifell - Tatjé, Pilar Marquès - Gou 
  
02/9 Governance Mechanisms in Spanish Financial Intermediaries 
Rafel Crespi, Miguel A. García-Cestona, Vicente Salas 
  
02/10 Endeudamiento y ciclos políticos presupuestarios: el caso de los ayuntamientos 
catalanes 
Pedro Escudero Fernández, Diego Prior Jiménez 
  
02/11 The phenomenon of international new ventures, global start-ups, and born-
globals:what do we know after a decade (1993-2002) of exhaustive scientific 
inquiry? 
Àlex Rialp-Criado, Josep Rialp-Criado, Gary A. Knight 
  
03/1 A methodology to measure shareholder value orientation and shareholder value 
creation aimed at providing a research basis to investigate the link between both 
magnitudes 
Stephan Hecking 
  
03/2 Assessing the structural change of strategic mobility. Determinants under 
hypercompetitive environments 
José Ángel Zúñiga Vicente, José David Vicente Lorente 
  
03/3 Internal promotion versus external recruitment: evidence in industrial plants 
Alberto Bayo-Moriones, Pedro Ortín-Ángel 
  
03/4 El empresario digital como determinante del éxito de las empresas puramente 
digitales: un estudio empírico 
Christian Serarols, José M.ª Veciana 
  
03/5 La solvencia financiera del asegurador de vida y su relación con el coste de capital 
Jordi Celma Sanz 
  
03/6 Proceso del desarrollo exportador de las empresas industriales españolas que 
participan en un consorcio de exportación: un estudio de caso 
Piedad Cristina Martínez Carazo 
  
03/7 Utilidad de una Medida de la Eficiencia en la Generación de Ventas para la 
Predicción del Resultado 
María Cristina Abad Navarro 
  
03/8 Evaluación de fondos de inversión garantizados por medio de portfolio insurance 
Sílvia Bou Ysàs 
  
03/9 Aplicación del DEA en el Análisis de Beneficios en un Sistema Integrado 
Verticalmente Hacia Adelante 
Héctor Ruiz Soria 
  
04/1 Regulación de la Distribución Eléctrica en España: Análisis Económico de una 
Década, 1987-1997 
Leticia Blázquez Gómez; Emili Grifell-Tatjé 
  
04/2 The Barcelonnettes: an Example of Network-Entrepreneurs in XIX Century Mexico. 
An Explanation Based on a Theory of Bounded Rational Choice with Social 
Embeddedness. 
Gonzalo Castañeda 
  
04/3 Estructura de propiedad en las grandes sociedades anónimas por acciones. 
Evidencia empírica española en el contexto internacional 
Rabel Crespí; Eva Jansson 
  
05/1 IFRS Adoption in Europe: The Case of Germany. 
Soledad Moya,  Jordi Perramon, Anselm Constans 
  
  
05/2 Efficiency and environmental regulation: a ‘complex situation’ 
Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, Diego Prior 
  
05/3 Financial Development, Labor and Market Regulations and Growth 
 Raquel Fonseca, Natalia Utrero 
  
06/1 Entrepreneurship, Management Services and Economic Growth 
 Vicente Salas Fumás, J. Javier Sánchez Asín 
  
06/2 Triple Bottom Line: A business metaphor for a social construct 
 Darrel Brown, Jesse Dillard, R. Scott Marshall 
  
06/3 El Riesgo y las Estrategias en la Evaluación de los Fondos de Inversión de Renta 
Variable 
 Sílvia Bou 
  
06/4 Corporate Governance in Banking: The Role of Board of Directors 
 Pablo de Andrés Alonso, Eleuterio Vallelado González 
  
06/5 The Effect of Relationship Lending on Firm Performance 
 Judit Montoriol Garriga 
  
06/6 Demand Elasticity and Market Power in the Spanish Electricity Market 
 Aitor Ciarreta, María Paz Espinosa 
  
06/7 Testing the Entrepreneurial Intention Model on a Two-Country Sample 
 Francisco Liñán, Yi-Wen Chen 
  
07/1 Technological trampolines for new venture creation in Catalonia: the case of the 
University of Girona 
 Andrea Bikfalvi, Christian Serarols, David Urbano, Yancy Vaillant 
  
07/2 Public Enterprise Reforms and Efficiency in Regulated Environments: the Case of 
the Postal Sector 
 Juan Carlos Morales Piñero, Joaquim Vergés Jaime 
  
07/3 The Impact of Prevention Measures and Organisational Factors on Occupational 
Injuries 
 Pablo Arocena, Imanol Núñez, Mikel Villanueva 
  
07/4 El impacto de la gestión activa en la performance de los fondos de inversión de 
renta fija 
 Sílvia Bou Ysàs 
  
07/5 Organisational status and efficiency: The case of the Spanish SOE “Paradores” 
 Magda Cayón, Joaquim Vergés 
  
07/6 Longitudinal Analysis of Enterpreneurship and competitiveness dynamics in Latin 
America 
 José Ernesto Amorós, Óscar Cristi 
  
08/1 Earnings Management and cultural values 
 Kurt Desender, Christian Castro, Sergio Escamilla 
  
08/2 Why do convertible issuers simultaneously repurchase stock? An arbitrage-based 
explanation 
 Marie Dutordoir, Patrick Verwijmeren 
  
08/3 Entrepreneurial intention, cognitive social capital and culture: empirical analysis 
for Spain and Taiwan 
 Francisco Liñán, Francisco Santos, José L. Roldán 
  
08/4 From creative ideas to new emerging ventures: the process of identification and 
exploitation among finnish design entrepreneurs  
 Henrik Tötterman 
  
08/5 Desempeño de la Política Comercial Pública en España 
 Manuel Sánchez, Ignacio Cruz, David Jiménez 
  
08/6 Gender Effects on Performance in Bulgarian Private Enterprises 
 Desislava Yordanova 
  
08/7 Entorno e iniciativa emprendedora: una perspectiva internacional 
 Claudia Álvarez, David Urbano 
  
09/1 Narrating Urban Entrepreneurship: A Matter of Imagineering? 
 Chris Steyaert, Timon Beyes 
  
09/2 Organizational Configurations of Strategic Choices and Strategic Management 
Accounting 
 Simon Cadez, Chris Guilding 
  
09/3 Agency Cost of Government Ownership: A study of Voluntary Audit Comitte 
Formation in China 
 David Hillier, Charlie X. Cai, Gaoliang Tian, Qinghua Wu 
  
09/4 Public Policy for Entrepreneurship and Innovation: Impact in Managed and 
Entrepreneurial Economies 
 Karen Murdock 
  
09/5 Glocalization as a Generic Entrepreneurial Strategy 
 Bengt Johanisson 
  
09/6 Assesing Advertising Efficiency: Does the Internet Play a Role? 
 Albena Pergelova, Diego Prior, Josep Rialp 
  
09/7 Start-up Conditions and the Performance of Women – and Men- Controlled 
Businesses in Manufacturating Industries 
 Otilia Driga, Diego Prior 
  
10/1 Devolution Dynamics of Spanish Local Government 
 Maria Teresa Balaguer-Coll, Diego Prior, Emili Tortosa-Ausina 
  
10/2 Los derivados financieros como herramienta para evaluar la reforma laboral: una 
aproximación binomial 
 Sílvia Bou, Albert Hernández, Carlota Linares 
  
10/3 Environmental Factors And Social Entrepreneurship   
 Elisabeth Ferri, David Urbano 
  
10/4 Accounting Conservatism and Firm Investment Efficiency 
 Beatriz García, Juan Manuel García, Fernando Penalva 
  
10/5 The Complementarity Between Segment Disclosure and Earnings Quality, and its 
Effect on Cost of Capital 
 Belén Blanco, Juan M. García, Josep A. Tribó 
  
10/6 Revisiting the Size-R&D Productivity Relation: Introducing the Mediating Role of 
Decision-Making Style on the Scale and Quality of Innovative Output 
 José Lejarraga, Ester Martínez 
  
10/7 Nuevos y viejos criterios de rentabilidad que concuerdan con el criterio del Valor 
Actual Neto 
 Emilio Padilla, Joan Pascual 
  
10/8 A cognitive attempt to understanding female entrepreneurial potential: the role of 
social norms and culture 
 Francisco Liñán, Muhammad A. Roomi , Francisco J. Santos 
  
11/1 Behavioral Aspects of Investment Fund's Markets: Are Good Managers Lucky or 
Skilled? 
 Sílvia Bou, Magda Cayón 
  
11/2 Place Marketing Performance: Benchmarking European Cities as Business 
Destinations. 
 Albena Pergelova 
  
11/3 Portfolio Selection with Skewness: A Comparison of Methods and a Generalized 
Two Fund Separation Result 
 Walter Briec, Kristiaan Kerstens, Ignace Van de Woestyne 
  
11/4 Can organizational commitment be experienced by individuals pursuing 
contemporary career paths? 
 Mihaela Enache, Jose M. Sallan, Pep Simo and Vicenc Fernandez  
  
11/5 Social Capital and the Equilibrium Number of Enterpreneurs. 
 Vicente Salas-Fumás, J.Javier Sanchez-Asin 
  
11/6 Determinants of Acquisition Completion: A Relational Perspective. 
 Ruth V. Aguilera, John C. Dencker  
  
11/7 SME’s Environmental CSR Investment: Evaluation, Decision and Implication. 
 F. Merlinda  
12/1 Debt Enforcement and Relational Contracting. 
 Martin Brown, Marta Serra-García 
  
12/2 Stockholder Conflicts and Dividends 
 Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu 
  
12/3 The “Death of Environmentalism” Debates: Forging Links Between SEA and Civil 
Society. 
 Judy Brown, Jesse Dillard 
  
12/4 Evaluación y rediseño de la red pública educativa. Un análisis centralizado. 
 Laura López, Diego Prior 
  
12/5 Organizational resources and intrapreneurial activities: A cross-country study. 
 Andreu Turró, David Urbano 
  
12/6 The Hidden Costs of Hidden Debt. 
 Johan Almenberg and Arteshes Karapetyan 
  
12/7 The Effects of Walking while Working on Productivity and Health: A Field 
Experiment. 
 Avner Ben-Ner, Darla Flint Paulson, Gabriel Koepp, James Levine 
  
12/8 How does Ownership Structure influence Bank Risk? Analyzing the Role of 
Managerial Incentives. 
 Mónica López-Puertas Lamy 
 
